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Foucault; Epicureanism; Care of the Self; Aesthetics of Existence; Ethics
This work investigates the reinterpretation of the concept of “care of the self” in the work of Michel Foucault, with special emphasis on his analysis of Epicurus’s ethical thought. The dissertation demonstrates how Foucault, in his course The Hermeneutics of the Subject, recovers ancient philosophy not as a theoretical field, but as a way of life, a set of exercises that shape subjectivity. The central question guiding this analysis is how Epicurus’s philosophy, in particular, offers a model for understanding philosophy as an “aesthetics of existence.” The research explores how Epicureanism, by emphasizing the importance of self- affirmation, the pursuit of autarky (self-sufficiency), and pleasure as a relationship with oneself, contributed to an ethics manifested in practices of freedom and the construction of the subject. The analysis details the Epicurean view of care of the self as an unconditional imperative, applicable to all regardless of social status, and that integrates body and soul, unlike the Platonic tradition. This assimilation between philosophizing and care for one’s own soul, advocated by Epicurus, inspires Foucault to see philosophy as an unceasing work on oneself, a process of continuous transformation. The methodology employed is textual analysis, with an in-depth reading of Foucault’s works as well as the philosophical texts of Epicurus that he discusses. The analysis aims to highlight the influence of Epicureanism on Foucault’s conception that philosophy, through work on oneself, offers paths to self-transcendence and the courage of truth (parrhesia). For Foucault, the courage to tell the truth about oneself and to use it for self-transformation is the great articulation between knowledge and action. The work argues that it is through this lens that Foucault reads and recovers Epicureanism, finding in it a model for his own philosophy as an “experimentation” and a “trial” that modifies the subject. The objective, therefore, is not to transpose a “golden age,” but to rehabilitate the idea that life can be a work of art, an art of oneself (tékhne tou bíou), a mode of resistance and reinvention of the subject.