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Cognitive Neuroscience; Philosophy of Mind; Epistemology; Ontology; Emergentism; Relativistic Brain Theory.
The reductionist assertion “we are our brain” epitomizes a hegemonic paradigm in cognitive neuroscience, whose ontological and epistemological assumptions lack rigorous philosophical scrutiny. Addressing this gap, this thesis investigates the onto-epistemological status of Miguel Nicolelis’ Relativistic Brain Theory (RBT/TCR), assessing whether it constitutes a new scientific paradigma or a scientific perspective. This theoretical-philosophical research constructs an analytical framework based on a physicalist metaphysical foundation, from which two axes unfold: Ontology (of process and emergentist) and epistemology (naturalized). The results demonstrate that although the RBT does not achieve Kuhnian paradigm status due to the lack of a consolidated disciplinary matrix, it is best defined as a scientific perspective in Giere’s sense, being fundamentally compatible with a process ontology. As a corollary of this analysis, we propose the reconceptualization of the theory as “Perspectivist Brain Theory (PBT/TCP)”, a nomenclature that more accurately captures its epistemological nature. We conclude that the RBT represents a robust and non-reductionist alternative to the prevailing paradigm, whose potential calls for future dialogue with phenomenology, the physics of complexity, and the Epistemology of the Global South.