CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL CONNECTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZILIAN COMPANIES
Political Connections; Capital Structure; Bank Debt; Law No. 13.165/2015; Brazilian Companies
This study examines the relationship between political connections and bank debt financing among publicly traded Brazilian companies, considering the institutional changes introduced by Law No. 13,165/2015. To achieve this objective, Difference-in-Differences (DiD) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models were estimated, incorporating financial and corporate governance controls, firm and year fixed effects, and heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors. The sample comprises non-financial companies listed on B3 from 2010 to 2024, using financial data obtained from the LSEG Workspace, electoral information from the
Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (TSE), and board member data from the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM). The results indicate that, when analyzed over the entire sample period, politically connected firms exhibit a lower proportion of bank debt in their capital structure than non-connected firms. However, the dynamic analyses reveal a different pattern, with positive associations observed in most years
following the enactment of Law No. 13,165/2015, particularly in periods close to the end of political terms. This pattern is especially evident for political connections established through campaign donations made by members of the board of directors and through board interlocking relationships, although both the sign and magnitude of
the estimated coefficients vary over time. Sectoral and macro-sector analyses further show that the effects of political connections are not homogeneous across economic activities. In several cases, results obtained for individual sectors are not replicated after sectors are aggregated into macro-sectors, suggesting that the relationship between political connections and bank debt financing depends on sector-specific economic and institutional characteristics. In addition, no statistically significant differences were found when political connections were analyzed jointly with state ownership, although this evidence should be interpreted with caution due to the limited number of observations combining both characteristics. Overall, the findings suggest that the relationship between political connections and bank debt financing is conditional rather than uniform, varying according to the channel through which political connections are established, the economic sector, and the timing of the political cycle. From a methodological perspective, this study also expands the set of political connection measures available for the post-Law No. 13,165/2015 Brazilian institutional environment by introducing campaign donations made by board members as an exploratory proxy for political connections. Nevertheless, this proxy should be interpreted with caution, as it may also reflect individual political preferences, personal networks, or behaviors that are not necessarily coordinated by the firm.