THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD OF DIRECTORS CHARACTERISTICS AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT:
COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE FROM DEVELOPED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES
board of directors; earnings management; corporate governance; developed economies; emerging economies.
The board of directors plays a central role in corporate governance by monitoring managers' actions and mitigating agency conflicts. In this context, this study examines the relationship between the structural and functional characteristics of the board of directors and earnings management in firms from developed and emerging economies, considering both discretionary accrual-based and real earnings management practices. Grounded in Agency Theory and Resource Dependence Theory, the study investigates the influence of CEO duality, board independence, board size, average board tenure, board-specific expertise, gender diversity, and formal diversity policies on earnings management. The sample comprises 1,749 firms, totaling 8,792 firm-year observations across 29 countries (19 developed and 10 emerging economies) over the 2015–2025 period. Data were obtained from the LSEG Workspace database and analyzed using the System Generalized Method of Moments (System GMM), complemented by fixed-effects models as robustness tests. The results indicate partial support for the general hypothesis, showing that the influence of board characteristics varies according to the type of earnings management and the institutional environment. In developed economies, only board size showed a consistent association with lower accrual- based earnings management, whereas no robust evidence was found for emerging economies. The findings suggest that the effectiveness of internal corporate governance mechanisms depends on board characteristics, the type of earnings management, and the institutional context, thereby extending the literature on corporate governance and accounting information quality.