Opportunistic flow encryption between programmable data planes through in-band signaling
Cryptography; cryptographic keys exchange; software defined networks; AES; P4.
The Software-Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm has been widely used in diverse ecosystems as enabler for the management of heterogeneous administrative domains, extend programmable resources to intra-domain networks, or even compose cloud-native network architectures. On the other hand, while it can support the ability of next-generation networks to adapt to new protocols, SDN increases the scope of attack vectors to the network, resulting in several security issues. From this point of view, control applications running atop the SDN controller are responsible for establishing secure connections between the underlying node pairs. The secure exchange of cryptographic keys, so that two interconnected nodes can communicate securely over a public channel, represents a well-known challenge in symmetric cryptography systems field of research. The Diffie–Hellman (DH) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) stands to a widely adopted solution for exchanging cryptographic keys and encrypting traffic between nodes over untrusted networks. However, traditional cryptographic implementations impose high computational costs and key management risks, which can result to problems in the centralized control plane of the SDN network. This research sets out by exploring the Programming Protocol-independent Packet Processors (P4) paradigm, and proposes the dh-aes-p4 as the first solution for exchanging DH keys with AES adapted tailored to P4-based SDN devices. Although there exist similar cases in the literature, this work distinguishes itself as a new, low-cost, granular (based on network flows) and transparent alternative.