A Philosophical Analysis of the Tonk Problem by Means of a Descriptive Logical Conventionalism
The Tonk Problem; Trivialism; Possibilism; Explanatory Logical Conventionalism; Logical Inferentialism
This thesis argues that a necessary condition for a language to be meaningfully employed is that its consequence relation is non-trivial. It advances a transcendental argument, grounded in Wittgenstein’s notion of forms of life, to show that a trivial language is inconceivable. The thesis begins by introducing the tonk problem in its historical and philosophical context, defending the view that a fully Wittgensteinian approach remains underdeveloped. It then examines recent defenses and reevaluations of trivialism and possibilism, highlighting their connection with explanatory logical conventionalism and contrasting it with a descriptive logical conventionalism that understands language and consequence relation as mutually dependent. Hopefully, this framework will contribute to a deeper understanding of the essential conditions for meaningful linguistic practice and the boundaries of logical possibility.