This dissertation aim to explain what means the State from the works of Marx and Engels. According to these authors, the institution has undergone several transformations since its creation, however, what all forms of State have in common is the aspect of instrument of opression of the ruling class. Just like the social classes, the State did not aways exist or exist forever, it is an institution thats corresponds to a certain degree of development of social producion capacity. The conflict between the productive forces and the way in which society organizes itself to produce and reproduce the means of life is reflected in class struggles and the creation and extinction of social institutions. In order to understand what the state means for the creators of scientific socialism, our research investigates the emergence of the institution, the relationship between state and ideology and the transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the end of the state from the assumptions of dialectical materialism.

The objective of this work is to present the notion of happy life in Seneca the Younger. To achieve this objective will be considered the reflections of Seneca encountered in the follow books: The Happy Life (De Vita Beata), Moral Epistles (Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium). One of the important elements of this discussion is the idea that happiness is encountered in each individual and not in the things, material goods and in the other people. Another important premise is self-confidence as the foundation of happiness, as Seneca maintains. The acknowledgement of what are vices and virtues completes the argumentation and will be central in this line. The idea that the human must act conforms to your self nature also is fundamental for comprehending what Seneca considers as happiness. In secondary form, it will be analyzed the atemporality of the concept of happiness, as defined by the philosopher. Atemporality is understood as something that never loses its validity. The actuality materializes from the moment that the revelation of Seneca's ideas about happiness becomes emergent. When one proposes a atemporality of Seneca's ideas, one does not mean that these ideas are in full use at our time, however, a question is proposed: is there a demand today for this way of experiencing happiness?

Can we identify points of convergence between the oppressions of class, race and gender? Based on the intersectional studies of Brazilian philosopher Lélia Gonzalez, we seek to analyse triple oppression, a reinterpretation of the concept of triple discrimination proposed by the thinker. Our aim is to analyse the connections between these three oppressions, while at the same time uncovering the essence of this complex phenomenon. In our view, the concept points to a strategy that prevents us from overcoming the structures of the capitalist system: the naturalisation of oppressions through the establishment of an abstract universal rationalism. We base our investigation on his work Springtime for the Black Roses, a compilation of articles covering writings from the 1970s to the 1990s. Using an analytical approach, we seek not only to explain and interpret the author's theses, but also to establish dialogues with other feminist, Marxian and decolonial thinkers, opting for a tripartite structure of chapters to capture the intertwining of class (chapter 1), race (chapter 2) and gender (chapter 3). To do this, we first discuss the process of marginalisation of black bodies, as one of the most exploited commodities for primitive accumulation in territories with unequal and combined development; then we show how the myth of racial democracy has been used to mask over-exploitation and create the "natural place" of black people; Finally, we highlight how the myth of racial democracy has been used to create the "natural place" of black people. 

The aim of this Master's thesis is to investigate the relationship between the concepts of work, rationality, and technology in Herbert Marcuse's work between 1928 and 1964, with the ultimate aim of contextualizing the critique of technology in One-Dimensional Man. To this end, relevant works from three different moments in this period were selected. Firstly, we investigate the role of the notion of labor both in Marcuse's re-reading of Heideggerian phenomenology, which he intended to use to complement Marxism, and in his own ontological conception of labor. Secondly, it is shown how, after joining the Institute for Social Research, there is a rationalist turn in Marcuse's thinking. The second chapter of this work aims to show how Marcuse set rationality as a parameter for a social organization aimed at human fulfillment, without, however, failing to criticize some of its developments and assumptions. In this context, Marcuse writes his first critique of technology, which is analyzed in this dissertation alongside his critique of rationality and some excerpts from Marx on the development of industry. In the third chapter, labor, rationality, and technology converge in Marcuse's analysis of one-dimensional society. The aim is to show how, in Marcuse's work, the ambiguity of technology and its effects on labor are directly related to the ambiguity of rationality itself. Finally, it presents some of the solutions proposed by Marcuse to bring together the realms of necessity and freedom.  In the light of the research, the aim is to contribute to the current debates on the subject, particularly those postulated by Andrew Feenberg and John Abromeit.

The antagonism between reason and instinct is at the core of the criticism that the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche leveled against Socrates. Nietzsche saw in him the authority behind an innovative movement that was responsible for leading the Greeks from an artistic culture, where instincts prevailed, to a new culture based on rational principles. Socrates, according to Nietzsche, founded a revolutionary form of reflection within Greek culture and among young Athenians, in which logical principles were the key to understanding reality, confirmed by his eloquent argumentative ability. The Socrates presented by Nietzsche is an ambivalent figure: a character capable of great achievements but, due to his excessively logical nature and declared opposition to instincts, a monstrosity per defectum, as stated in The Birth of Tragedy. 

The present research aims to reflect about the Absurdity, central concept of the philosophical essay The Myth of Sisyphus: Essay on the Absurd (1942), in dialogue with the narrative essays from his youth, The Other Side and the Right (1937) and Marriage in Tipasa (1939), works by the French-Algerian philosopher Albert Camus (1913-1960). Camus’ philosophy is marked by the limitation of reason in apprehending reality, restricting itself to describing appearances, changes, and movements of the Becoming. The image is designated for the representation of the rational obstacle, functioning as an argumentative resource in order to build the philosophical concept, through successive images that illustrate the transitoriness of reality. In this way, the concept of the Absurd is formed from the imagetic representations that illustrate the negative condition of human existence. The images refer to the ways that the Absurd affects the human being. First, in the sensible form called "feeling of Absurdity", then in the intellectual form, named "notion of Absurdity", a Camus’ expression that denotes the concept of Absurdity. Finally, the paper moves towards the analysis of the narrative essays of youth in the light of the Absurd, in order to unveil the presence of the concept since the first writings of Albert Camus, indicating the conceptual link between the analyzed essays.

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The purpose of this research is to make explicit the conceptual triad of autarchy (autárkeia), freedom (eleuthería) and friendship (philía) which, when articulated, makes possible an ethical interpretation of Epicurus' thought about human relations in molecular communities. The investigation begins with a general introduction about Epicurus' ethics, the scope and possibilities of this ethics, establishing relationships between the primary textual sources - namely, Letter to Herodotus, Letter to Pythocles, and Letter to Menoeceus, in addition to the Principal Docrtines, the Vatican Sayings and, finally, the fragments of the Peri Phýseos (On Nature) of Epicurus. In a second moment, the purpose here is to present the basic notions that appear in the remaining texts of Epicurus as basic notions helping to define the concept of human relations. The contexture of these concepts will serve to demonstrate what kind of human relationships can be assessed in these molecular communities and how they differ from the worn-out human relationships of the decadent polis. A third moment consists of showing how human relations are possible within Epicurus' philosophical community, through the definition of what Epicurus' philosophical molecular communities were, as well as showing how, within these, such human relations are made viable and possible. From this conceptual web of human relations, we will seek to tread a new path for understanding the way of life in the community of the Garden (Képos).

In this thesys, we aim to defend the proposition that Technoprogressive Transhumanism, as formulated by James Hughes and David Wood, has the potential to cultivate a new metanarrative. This metanarrative may provide a framework for envisaging solutions to the numerous atrocities culminating in existential risk. Transhumanism is not a singular, all-encompassing philosophical, cultural, political, and social movement. The subdivisions primarily arise due to the political nuances guiding each submovement. Alongside Technoprogressive Transhumanism, there is Extropianism, established by Max More and entrenched in neoliberalism, as well as UpWingers, founded by FM-2030 – or his former name, Fereidon Esfandiary – presenting an alternative political vision to the traditional right-left dichotomy. We critique Extropianism for being grounded in the failed foundations of post-2008 neoliberalism and for its inconsistency in adopting a life-affirming philosophy based on the recurring practice of austerity. We argue that, while transhumanism has its roots in humanism, its propositions surpass it. Despite the benefits humanism provided by introducing the concept of the human and its associated dignity, rights, and prerogatives, thus liberating us from dependence on the divine, the movement also initiated processes of dehumanization. Consequently, it falls to Technoprogressive Transhumanism to propose a utopian scenario wherein an end to the suffering of humans and other animals is envisaged through the use of technology, an extension of our nature, and an optimistic philosophy of life affirmation.

The Turing Test, developed by Alan Turing as “the imitation game” in his paper Computing Machinery and Intelligence (1950), brought to light the discussion about the (im)possibility of thinking and intelligent digital machines. After its publication, the Turing Test has been the subject of countless criticisms and objections. One of the most relevant objections to this test is The Chinese Room Argument, which was developed by the North-American philosopher John Searle in his paper Minds, Brains, and Programs (1980), aiming to refute what he calls Strong Artificial Intelligence, as well as the Turing Test itself. This text intends to revisit the Turing Test, as well as the Chinese Room Argument, and to provide an analysis of the concept of intelligence in the context of the Turing Test, from the following issue: “How does Turing understand the concept of intelligence within his test? Is it human intelligence (called here genuine intelligence), or is it some other type of intelligence (whatever that intelligence may be)?” As research results, it is argued that 1) It is possible to interpret the Turing Test as not being developed to assess whether the digital computer involved possesses genuine (human) intelligence or not, but rather to evaluate if it can be considered intelligent in the sense of what is here called Turing-intelligence; 2) the Turing Test is not necessarily committed to Strong Artificial Intelligence; 3) the Chinese Room Argument does not always challenge the Turing Test; 4) the Turing Test is possible, i.e., achievable in practice, as long as it undergoes some modifications, resulting in a new version of the test, which is here denominated the Ideal Turing Test; 5) Chat-GPT is an example of an AI system capable of passing the Ideal Turing Test and, consquentely, being classified as Turing-intelligent. With such results, as a conclusion of the research and as a response to the previously stated question, the TT can be interpreted in such a way as to support the hypothesis that passing such a test is a sufficient condition for an AI system to possess not genuine intelligence, but rather another type of intelligence, namely Turing-intelligence.

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Our dissertation aims to show the evolution of the concept of gender within philosophy from a feminist perspective, approaching the first constructions of the concept within the historical context of the first and second feminist waves as a strategy against the oppressive discourse and the condition of women's inferiority observed in the lives and theories of English philosophers Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) and Brazilian Nísia Floresta (1810-1885) from the perspective of existentialist philosophy of French philosopher Simone Beauvoir (1908-1985) in her work The Second Sex (1949), that marks the discussions of the second feminist wave deconstructing all essentialism in gender roles for the free transcendence of the subject creator of its own project as a mark of freedom understanding this own movement of the existent, a theme discussed in her work The ethics of ambiguity (1947). This path was followed by these dissident women in their respective eras when they decided to write, they needed to justify themselves by the simple act of writing, they were labeled as strange, intruders, exotic and abnormal in the world of men, even yet they marked the precariousness of the philosophical consciousness of the tradition, denouncing the sexism of the time. Therefore, it is intended to demonstrate and reflect the contributions to a new way of thinking and transgressing - transcending - that has been developing for long centuries to break paradigms and the sexist canon of the history of thought, as well as the realization of these claims within the political field. The realization of the transcendence project must ensure the emancipation of contemporary women, here, specifically thought through the influence of beauvoirian works on the importance of studies of the signifier "woman" in Philosophy.

The present rese’arch investigates the meaning of the transcendental materialism proposed by Slavoj Zizek, observing the influence of the question of the transcendental posited by Immanuel Kant, as well as the controversies about the thing in itself and the influence of Jacques Lacan in the understanding of a virtual object and the death drive of a virtual object that takes the place of the thing in itself. We elucidate portion of the conceptual entaglement of zizekian philosophy that is part of the construction of philosophy and observe its attempt to constructe an ontology and metaphysics capable of escaping the traps of relativism and realism. We show that, to proceed with the Kant legacy of thought forces a consistent philosophy to adopt a kind of skepticism in relation to what is beyond appearances, which Zizek could only avoid by radically modifying the meaning of the thing in itself, trivializing the question about what is “beyond appearances”. The world, thus, is contained in its appearing without the question “what appears?” to be made. The object that is not representation and can, therefore, take its place is understood as the object of the cause of desire, or in other words, the drive that, with its negativity, forces the movement of the splited elements into subjet and object; and, moreover, it precedes and creates the split itself. However, in this research, such negativity could only be found in the subject, leaving to the object the negativity of non-identity. In this way, a transcendental materialism that takes  drive as matter, as a thing in itself, proves to be insufficient to overcome skepticism and relativism, due to abandon the thing in itself as something that exists independently of the subject. A solution found, and according to the author's thinking, is considered both moments (materialism that assumes the primacy of the thing in itself and transcendentalism that assumes the primacy of the transcendental imagination) as irreducible points of perspective and without a third term of synthesis, so it is necessary to move from one perspective to the other and remain in between to see the parallax truth of transcendental materialism.

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Considering that in Brazil there is little bibliographic production regarding the thought of Maria Zambrano, mainly from a more philosophical perspective, since the works that appear on the platforms focus more on their religious/mystical and literary/aesthetic aspects, the respective dissertation aimed to fill this gap. Thus, the present dissertation was dedicated to reconstructing Maria Zambrano's critique of modernity (the crisis of reason), which consists of a genealogy of the Western/European crisis, called by Mercedes Gómez Blesá as Annihilation. In this way, from the historical-bibliographic research, in addition to the critical analysis of the historical, political and philosophical panorama, it was possible to identify the underlying concerns and motivations in his work (in which the genesis of the main notions of the Zambranian work can be found) , of poetic reason and persona), a modest systematic reorganization of the philosopher's writings and argumentation is also offered by exposing the stages and thematic axes of her thinking (critical or negative and affirmative or positive), which present all aspects of Zambranian thought: that start from a concern with an ethical and political dimension and migrate to an explanation of the crisis from an ontological and epistemological dimension, which lead to contributions, both in the aforementioned areas of knowledge, and in philosophical aesthetics. That said, this itinerary contributes to the identification, understanding and justification of the origins, relationships and purposes of the main notions of Zambrano's work (poetic reason and persona), as an alternative and overcoming modernity, with the aim of continuing to develop aspects specific to Zambranian thought.

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According to Nietzsche, the language is not able to reveal the truth; all that it produces are metaphors, transpositions, anthropomorthic creations. For him, the man knows by invent and he invents by to know. Create and relate metaphors make him the unique being able to invent, to produce images and transform them in linguistic signs. For Nietzsche, there isn’t adequation between the words and the things, since the origin of language is illogical and arbitrary, and what is called truth is result of human conventions that were, over time, poetic and rethorically enphasized; so, what exist are lies, arbitrariness or, simply, inventions that by unconsciousness and oblivion of the human animal are not recognized as such. The main objective of this thesis is to understand what is the Nietzsche’s interpretation about the notion of lie and also the difference for him established between two types of lie, those that degenerate the life and those that intensify it. The negative lies, contrary to life, they are linked to religious priest and dogmatic philosophers; these are criticized by Nietzsche for not recognizing themselves as inventors. The lies that are at service of life, Nietzsche calls poetic lies or artistic lies, it is an affirmative type that serves to beautify the life and recognize the man as artistic subject, it is linked to the figure of artist, whose purpose is not to cheat, but rather to recognize the appearence and fictionality of all knowledge. As we will see, the lies, depending of who invents it, they can take the life to degeneration or to its full affirmation

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This dissertation aims to analyze the dwelling and building according to the philosopher’s thought Martin Heidegger, considering his contribuition to thinking about the relationship between Philosophy and Architecture. Investigates dwell and build the Heideggerian conception of being-there as be-in-the-world, as well as trying to make explicit how the human dwells and builds in an era characterized by the consolidation of the exhaustion of being and the consummation of metaphysics. And, finally, we try to speculate how to dweell and build can occur from a perspective of rescue of essential dwelling.

This research addresses the problem of Philosophy of Nature and the interpretation of the world as Will in the context of Arthur Schopenhauer's Metaphysics. Thus, it lends itself to present some differences between Science and Metaphysics, once the former has epistemic limitations for attaining the world in itself, demonstrating the role played by Metaphysics concerning the revelation of the “originary forces”, which permeate the world as representation, despite the importance that Schopenhauer attaches to Sciences as a kind of “a posteriori” confirmation (Bestätgung) of his own doctrine. This is it because the data extracted from the experience confirms his central ideas about Nature. Furthermore, it discusses the problem of analogy and its use by Arthur Schopenhauer as a resource for metaphysical interpretation of body (microcosm) and world (macrocosm), as the philosopher sees the same essence in both of them, that is, will (Wille). Indeed, it discusses the objectification of the will and the nature of the intellect in the animal organism and its inseparable relationship with the problem of matter, in both senses (Materie and Stoff) and its permanence in the world, either as an abstract substance or as a concrete material of perceptions. Thus, it presents Schopenhauer's Theory of Ideas in the Metaphysics of Nature. As a result of the objectification of the will and its free determination of the world, it is questioned about the Teleology of Nature and the “final causes’ paradox”. Finally, it addresses the problem of self-consummation of the Will in the context of the struggle for matter and conservation of individuals, including the question of pessimism and suffering that is essential to all life.

The women's movements that endorse a liberal economy have historically proven to be insufficient and problematic in the face of the social and political demands of the most varied groups that make up society, because they do not understand what is behind the oppressions. It is possible to visualize this insufficiency from the work of Betty Friedan (one of the representatives of liberal feminism in the United States in the 1960s), who treats the issue of female subordination as an autonomous question, disconnected from the other oppressions maintained and accentuated by the capitalist mode of production. In order to understand this problem and overcome it, it will be necessary to explore Karl Marx's theory of value and, based on authors such as Silvia Federici, Angela Davis, Heleieth Saffioti and Ana Montenegro, understand how the capitalist mode of production uses inequalities already present in pre-capitalist societies to solidify social marks which allow greater exploitation. It is from the dehumanization or inferiorization of certain groups it becomes acceptable and legitimate they are even more exploited in relation to other groups. It is in this sense that the need to analyze what is behind the oppressions suffered by women arises, understanding feminism cannot be understood as an autonomous political movement which seeks only gender equality from moral changes in the construction of female autonomy, as Friedan proposes. For her, women's liberation is limited to their search for their own identity. This perspective moralizes an issue that demands a historical materialist analysis and a rupture within the mode of production before focusing on the subjective aspects. This does not mean that these aspects are not
relevant, but rather they are insufficient to carry out a complete and deep analysis of feminist issues.

This thesis analyses the concept of transfiguration in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and in the art of Alex Grey. The introduction presents the most important conceptual movements that will be realized along the text. The initial chapter presents an approach to the aesthetic, phenomenological, psychological, ethical and metaphysical aspects of transfiguration in the Nietzsche’s immanentist though: the subsequent parts and sections describe the genesis of the aesthetic act, the ecstatic rythms and the oneiric forms, the human art and the divine creation; the correspondence between art and life, the existence as a creative phenomenon and as the art imposes on becoming the character of being; the contemplative and the creative states, the doors of dreams and the keys of ecstaty, the oneiric artists and the ecstatic artists; the theme of overcoming nihilism through art, the degeneration of diseased souls, the crossing from the desert of death to the oasis of life; the metaphysical elements of nature, the creations of the God-artist and the artist-God, the divinization of existential reality; and define how transfiguration takes place in the philosopher’s view. The intermediate chapter presents an understanding of the aesthetic, phenomenological, psychological, ethical and metaphysical aspects of transfiguration in the Grey’s transcendentalist art: the subsequent parts and sections describe the movements of the creative process, the foundations of the visionary’s journey, the artist’s planetary mission; the expansive states of mind, the possibilities of the aesthetic experience, the evolution of creative consciousness; the relevance of visionary art to the health of humanity, the prognosis of a collapse of civilization, the reversal of a terminal disaster for mankind; the overcoming of existential nihilism through the aesthetic act, the labyrinth of pathological nightmares, the supraversive power of metamorphosis; the constellation of metaphysical thinkers in art, the group of pioners of experimental mysticism, the correlation between perennial philosophy and contemporary though; and define how transfiguration happens from the artist’s perspective. The final chapter presents the proximities and distances between the Nietzsche’s though and the Grey’s work: the subsequent parts highlight the movement of transfiguration in nature and in the universe; from the perspective of aesthetic activity; in the artist’s phenomenological circumscription; in the psychodinamic experience of creation; on the horizon of visionary metaphysics; and the result of intersection of the worlds. All in all and in short: the conclusion of the thesis pretends to highlight the connection between the concept of transfiguration, contemporary philosophy and visionary art.

A recent trend in the philosophy of logic, under the title of "anti-exceptionalism", proposes that the epistemology of logic should be approximated to that of science: logical theories are not justified by a priori intuitions, but rather, as in the other sciences, by a posteriori (or empirical) evidence. How exactly the relation of logic and science is to be fleshed out by the anti-exceptionalist remains to be determined.  An approach favored by many is to adopt "the abductive method" to select the best logical theory. This approach is not without its problems, or so it is argued herein. Anti-exceptionalism should not stand or fall on the merits of logical abductivism, or those of any method of theory revision in particular. Rather than defining anti-exceptionalism in terms of applying the scientific methodology of theory revision to logic, the present thesis proposes to define it simply in terms of rational theory revision. Such definition allows for divergent ontological and methodological views to fall under the scope of anti-exceptionalism. The present dissertation articulates what rational theory revision of logic looks like beyond logical abductivism.

    Pleasure is the main engine that boosts human behavior, a force of nature that drives life to its utmost affirmation. That is why it is also the greatest ethical and moral issue for a whole thinking tradition, from Democritus to contemporary neuroscientists. Michel Onfray, one of the most interesting libertarian thinkers acting in the current French intellectual scenario, claims that there is no ethics outside Hedonism, which is why his work is organized according to the long lineage of hedonistic philosophical tradition. Onfray thinks of body and pleasure as existential guides by means of conceiving human being as an entity comprised of raw passions and vital forces that need to be shaped by a philosophical and ethical project. Therefore, this study addresses this jubilant ethics from two important works of Onfray’s bibliography: L’Art de jouir: pour un matérialisme hédoniste (1991); and La Sculpture de soi: la Morale esthétique (1993). Considering such texts as theoretical horizon, this study is organized into four chapters. The first one addresses the body – a hypesthetic machine of which every philosophy is the expression. The Existential Hapax that guides this chapter was developed by Onfray in order to manage the relation between body and thought. Afterwards, the foundations of Hedonism are addressed by seeking to examine the very nature of pleasure and pain as primary affections of life. Hence, the following questions are raised: Why is pleasure a moral issue? What are its ethical implications? Is pleasure a necessary condition for happiness? Are Hedonism and Eudemonism distinct or intertwined notions? In the third chapter, the founding ethical developments of Hedonism are discussed, which are unfolded by the philosophies of Aristippus and Epicurus – two thinkers from the ancient Greece. A commented presentation of Onfray’s interpretation concerning such representatives of Hedonism is proposed in this chapter. Pleasure and Style title the fourth and last chapter of this dissertation. In fact, the Ethical Hedonism of Onfray is synonymous with aesthetics of existence. Based on Nietzsche, Onfray addresses an individualism that is not a selfish. In addition, Onfray supports an ethical relativism contrary to all castrating morals and glimpse the conception of oneself out of the raw and chaotic material of which we are made in advance. Afterwards, Onfray proposes a theory called aesthetic enjoyment in which the author contemplates the body and its five senses but emphasizing the smell, taste and touch, since these are ignoble senses devoid of intellectual status, according to the idealistic tradition to which Onfray opposes. In conclusion, the purpose of Onfray’s work is to promote a rematerialization of life as a way to counteract the contemporary nihilism – something only possible if there is a reconciliation with the body in order to affirm its hedonic power. Hence, it arises Onfray’s conception that philosophy is an art of living and not only a theory. In this ethical project that celebrates friendship as the greatest virtue, the hedonistic thinker aims to “know how to loyally enjoy oneself”.

   This work aims to investigate and reorganize in a systematic way some problems related to the right of resistance and political revolution according to Immanuel Kant’s Practical Philosophy. The work is divided into three chapters. The first one is dedicated to a presentation of Kant’s Political Philosophy in its great lines. In order to enforce the referred systematic aspect of this inquiry, it is first of all examined the normativity as a content of the idea of republic which is a common element already outlined in the Critique of Pure Reason and then consolidated through the conception of a necessary connection between the domains of morals and law. In the second chapter, based on the practical structure proposed by Kant, the question of resistance is analyzed from the perspective of Positive Law and Morality. Furthermore, it is to be mentioned the relationship between Kant’s work and the troubled historical context of the late 18th Century. Thus, the investigation aims to come to an understanding of how external elements, namely the French Revolution and its ideals, may have had some influence on the 1790s’ Kant’s essays. In the final chapter, Kant’s argument is reconstructed from the point of view of the project of a Universal History. In line with a debate already recognized by Kantian scholarship, it is investigated whether the Philosophy of History can offer a positive meaning to revolutions despite the impasses that pervade such a controversial theme.

In Schopenhauer’s philosophy, freedom lies in the Will only, actions are necessarily determined by causality. Thus, how would this simultaneous performance be compatible in man, the freedom of metaphysical will and the determinism of individual actions? Schopenhauer assures that every action is determined in the same proportion as a clock, but he also declares that man in his essence is will, which is free, almighty and enigmatic. This apparent contradiction can lead to the following question: how can man be determined, as in, not able to decide to be otherwise, but yet may be considered as his own work? This research follows analyzing the concepts involved in the problem brought up, looking for the answers that we can find in Schopenhauer’s thought. Once understanding that according to determinism actions are the result of motives known by the intellect in contact with the individual character, we will deal with the attributes of the character, taking into account that it is the will in itself as it comes objectified in a individual, as well as the secondary and accidental nature of the intellect, which despite being placed by tradition as the nucleus of man and the center of moral responsibility, we will see that it has an auxiliary role as a mere part of an organism. The will takes therefore precedence over the intellect as the essence and origin of man. For an understanding of its originary position we will analyze the meaning of the term aseity, considered by our author as indispensable for thinking about responsibility and imputability. We will also deal with the main objections and difficulties raised by scholars and commentators of Schopenhauer’s thought. The main question is to understand to what extent man can be held morally responsible for his actions, while it is his own work, in the sense of possessing aseity as an attribute, considering the freedom of the will and the determinism of the actions.

The purpose of this work is to present and develop the relation among words, equality, emancipation, aesthetics, and politics in the work of Jacques Rancière from the hypothesis that words are, beyond signs of communication, means by which one can reconfigure a distribution of the sensible. One conceives, in general, that writing is to submit words to certain sets of rules and knowledges. One still conceives that the words found in the books of literature or those found in certain packing labels do not carry any potence by which subjects could verify their equality with other subjects and engender their emancipation. This work seeks, however, to follow another way and to demonstrate that history offers us counter-examples to these general conceptions, namely, that the words of literature and those of packing labels are potencial motors of emancipation to anyone. Therefore, it will be divided into four moments. In the first place, it will show French pedagogue Joseph Jacotot’s intellectual adventure, recalled by Rancière in the 1980’s to sustain his thesis about the equality of intelligences. This equality, however, is only possible to the extent that it is mediated by the experience of a distance made possible by a book and its words. The second moment of this work will deal with what Rancière calls literary democracy and in what way, indirectly, Jacotot’s experience indicates this democracy. Words fly without control and can be said and written, including, by those who do not have the right to use them. The word is democratic because it can be said out of its place. If one can talk about literary democracy, it is due to the way of being that words acquire in modernity. It is under the mode of the mute speech that not only literature, but the so called social sciences on its path, constituted themselves as such. And it is about this institution that the third chapter will talk. Rancière makes a reconstruction of the origins of the method of the historian science by going back to the way of literature writing. Literature, in its turn, is written not only from the fluctuation of words without control, but also from the reconfiguration of the sensible that they engender. It is not by chance that writing is, for Rancière, a political activity. The fourth chapter of this work will deal with that finally by starting from the Aristotelian distinction between those who have the speech (logos) and those who have only the voice (phonè). Rancière challenges this division by affirming that politics is only possible by the rupture of the sensible distribution that establishes, on the one hand, the speakers and, on the other hand, those who cannot speak. Finally, politics is only possible to the extent that there is a redefinition of words by those who, right before, were forbidden of using them. But also politics is only possible to the extente that it plays with the limits of those prohibitions, making speak those who did not speak or making visible those who were not seen.

Ce travail postule que à travers une pragmateía (πραγματεία), Epicure cherche à refléter une connaissance de la nature (physiología) dans un éthos équivalent, revalidant la conception épicurienne de la philosophie comme savoir pour la vie (téchnev tiná perí ton bíon) et de la sagesse comme activité constante de réflexion sur la nature (phýsis) et de réalisation d'une manière d'être selon elle (katà phýsin). C'est dans un tel panorama, où l'homme cherche une approximation avec la nature pour reproduire dans son âme un état d'imperturbabilité (ataraxía), que se dessine la possibilité de réalisation de soi ou l'exercice d'une vie sage. En ce sens, la pragmateía épicurienne fait référence à une pratique philosophique développée dans la réalisation d'un ensemble d'activités (enérgeias) qui se traduisent par des attitudes, des conduites, des choix, des actions et des pensées un éthos philosophique visant la recherche de l'équilibre. Si dans les textes d'Épicure les occurrences du terme pragmateía sont limitées, en revanche, en exhortant la pratique philosophique à travers des exercices de méditation (melétema) et praxis (práxis), cela nous permet de montrer, à partir de l'utilisation de ces notions et d'autres liés à eux, un sens à la pragmateía, ce qui nous permet de comprendre comment la physiología se traduit par un mode de vie sage. Dans cette perspective, nous visons à démontrer que la pragmateía épicurienne établit sa signification la plus appropriée lorsqu'il est compris comme un exercice éthique. En effet, c'est en tant que travail permanent et interdépendant de méditation et de praxis qu'elle conduit la pensée et l'action à rétablir chez l'homme le sens de l'autarcie (autárkeia), condition nécessaire pour le entamer la disposé à définir un éthos basée sur la compréhension de la nature et, avec cela, de pouvoir jouir d'une vie libre, authentique, équilibrée et heureuse. De telles affirmations sont basées sur l'analyse de la pensée laissée par Épicure (IVe siècle avant JC), conservée dans trois épîtres (Lettre à Ménécée, Lettre à Pytoclès et Lettre à Hérodote), 40 Maximes Capitales et 81 Sentences Vaticanes. La doxographie conservée et collectée par Diogène Laërce, par Hermann Usener, ainsi que les fragments récupérés de la bibliothèque d'Herculanum et ceux découverts sur le site archéologique d'OEnoanda ont également été analysés. À cet ensemble de rapports, d’où ressortent les voix des épicuriens tels que Filodemo de Gádara, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes de OEnoanda entre autres, a été ajoutées l'oeuvre Sur la nature des choses, du poète romain Lucrèce (1er siècle avant JC). Ce travail était divisé en quatre chapitres. La première présente les fondements de la pragmateía épicurienne ou comme la physiología, la phýsis, l’anthropophýsis, la connaissance (gnósis) et la technique (téchne) sont pensées par Epicuro. Le second aborde la méditation (melétema) ou comment la pragmateía constitue comme un exercice de l'âme pour penser la nature en vue d'établir une pratique de vie autarchique et heureuse. La troisième partie de ce travail traite de la praxis (práxis) ou de la façon dont la pragmateía se rapporte à toute activité orientée - selon un paradigme naturel compris de la physiología - pour faire éprouver au sage dans sa vie un sentiment d'équilibre et de réalisation de soi. Enfin, dans le quatrième chapitre, la pragmateía épicurienne est abordée sous l'angle d'un exercice éthique, un aspect fondamental pour comprendre la cohérence, l'unité et le soutien d'une philosophie qui s'étend à la manière de penser et d'agir du sage. 

This thesis aims to examine the nature of the relationship that Hegel establishes with the tradition of skeptical thought. In short, our approach consists in showing the fact that the main arguments of the ancient pyrrhonians play a fundamental role in the whole of Hegelian philosophy and that, far from neglecting, or simply treating the problem of skepticism marginally, Hegel starts from the principle that the only viable form of legitimate philosophical foundation is to take skepticism seriously.

Quantifying expressions have been part of the history of philosophy and logic at least since Aristotle’s creation of syllogism. Another pivotal moment in the history of these expressions is the introduction of the formal system in Frege’s Begriffsschrift, which includes axioms for quantifying individual objects and concepts. Since quantifiers are also a type of concept, Frege calls them "second-level concepts". With the advent of model theory (in the 1950s) the semantic notion of "interpretation" promotes a Copernican revolution in this field of study and in the way of defining Fregean "concepts", by emphasizing on quantifying expressions. Such a revolution does not merely consist of a new way of presenting Frege’s quantifiers but has made it possible to expand the range of quantifiers that can be implemented. This opening to new possibilities is due, basically, to the work of Mostowski (1957) and Lindström (1966) that develop the notion of generalized quantification. There are, however, limits both to this implementation and to the interpretation of certain natural language quantifiers. The dependence of an expression on a context is one of the barriers that natural language imposes on formal logic. In this sense, Grice in 1975 makes room in his ’Logic and Conversation’ for another look at the "logic of ordinary language". This thesis proposes an analysis of the various attempts to formalize quantifiers in natural languages. We start from an approach that investigates logical and pragmatic aspects of quantifiers and aim at a classification of quantifiers that we believe can elucidate problems on the limits of definitions of these expressions.

This study consisted in an effort of thinking a politics of images coming from Georges DidiHuberman, which, to some degree, required us to come up with three planes of composition: one in the field of knowledge, finding in his heuristics the axis capable of articulating a knowledge in relationship to páthos. Therefore, we resorted to an aesthetic paradigm of thought taken from the philosophy of Walter Benjamin, known as constellation. Thus, the constellation of heuristics has enabled us to compose one such kind of knowledge conjoined with emotions; one in the field of politics, which, instead of differentiating between public and private, potentiality and actuality, praxis and poiesis, is itself inscribed in some other sphere, the one of gestures, allowing us to meet up with a politics of exposition, in which it exposes what is about to be lost- what is disappearing. Right there, paradoxically, we see ourselves faced with the being in common, which appears when exposed and when we appear along with it, thus requiring from us other modes of relation: imagination, taking a stand and empathy; at last, one in the field of image, which, instead of being a reservoir of human illusions, becomes a place of removal of knowledges: about our sufferings, about what we are not, about pasts that didn‟t come to be, about what we‟re still incapable of knowing, about actually not-knowing, about cholera and about our potentialities. All of this meant to think and point out the displacements of images in the body of this other theory, this politics of images, whose function is to retrieve images to the free common usage of men, to make them cognizable. Perhaps, this would be it‟s main attribution: to make cognizable, so that all else is possible.

The objective of this thesis is to present the nietzschean proposal for the aesthetic conduct of everyday life as an ethical alternative to face the demotion of man. This ethical-aesthetic proposal by Nietzsche points to an affirmation of the powers of each singularity, guiding human existence from its creative bodily inclinations, as opposed to uniformity, massification and decay, referential traits present in the modern man's way of life - late, called by Nietzsche of "last man". To achieve a broad understanding and reach of this ethical-aesthetic project, we initially present crucial aspects of the new meaning imputed by Nietzsche to psychology, which assumes an approach to man from the physiopsychology of forces. Then we investigate the diagnosis that Nietzsche makes of his time, which requires understanding the nihilism of the last man as a symptom of the decay of a time, and, finally, we explain the Nietzschean ethical-aesthetic proposal of elevation and refinement of man based on art of living, the aesthetic conduct of everyday life, a movement that flows into the affirmation and beautification of life.

We start with the following proposition: in Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy, every Idea is immediately aesthetic. It is possible to think of an “unmediated” relationship between Ideas and sensation: sensation is the matrix of thought. Such proposition is supported insofar as Deleuze extracts from the encounter between philosophy and art a conception of genesis of thought throught experimentation. Both philosophy and art have their own creative Ideas and their specific ways of actualizing those Ideas, but both are directly related to the sensibilia or sensitive qualities. Our intent is to show how philosophy comes to have as indispensable the capacity that art has of putting us in contact with the differences in the sensible, which Deleuze calls transcendental empiricism under two fundamental implications: 1) the violence of involuntary encounters that make our faculties discordant, as a critic to the dogmatic way of thinking dominated by representation; 2) the philosophical research as a way of learning that puts the researcher in relationship with elements of a pre-individual vitality. We propose to divide our work in two stages: a pedagogy of the senses and a pedagogy of the concept. In the former, we make a genealogy of immanentist philosophical lineage which engenders our deleuzian concept of being of the sensible and of transcendental empiricism. In the latter, we investigate the relationships between art and philosophy in their acts of creation.

    This dissertation presents the reception of Neoplatonism in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, more specifically his Commentary on the Liber of Causis. As it is a synthesis of the Elements of Theology of Proclus, as St. Thomas will identify, the Liber de Causis preserves the same triadic, hierarchical and dynamic order that is the cause of all existence: Divine, Intelligible and Psychic. St. Thomas uses the Neoplatonic doctrine both to distinguish these causes and to investigate how they relate to each other, from the material being to the subsistent being itself, considering the ideas of participation of all beings in the First Being by a certain metaphysical causality and the concept of negativity of human knowledge versus the absolute transcendentality of the first cause.

     This research investigates the Wollstonecraft’s Dilemma, created by Carole Pateman from her observations between the claims of a citizenship for equality and a citizenship of difference by the feminist movement, starting from the claims of Mary Wollstonecraft, still in the eighteenth century. And from Pateman’s discussion of citizenship and the social condition of women, we will see how Chantal Mouffe presentes the proposal for the construction os a pluralistic agonistic citizenship, which intents to be the basis of a Radical Democracy and solve the dilemma of the claim equality and recognition of difference.

      The main proposal of this work is to investigate in Eros And Civilization (1955) and in One-dimensional Man, both by Herbert Marcuse, the way technological and pretechnological society determined the boundaries of freedom through the mind control mechanisms. This analysis first begins with Eros And Civilization, Marcuse’s reading about Freud’s anthropological speculations. In that text, Marcuse uses psychoanalysis to problematize the connection between civilization an repression, as well as the way to think the remaining spaces of freedom, represented by the refusal elements. Next, an approach is taken about One-dimensional Man, related to the new elements which appear around a closer domination in the developed capitalist countries and mark the almost complete disappearance of freedom in the technological society. From this discussion, it was verified that Marcuse's arguments are relevant for understanding the context of unopposed society and for thinking about possible strategies of resistance and political action in contemporary times.

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   The aim of this research is to analyze aspects of Augustinian political philosophy to identify where it resides and how the notion of power is given within the context of the concept of a just state. In order to achieve this, we can begin with the religious and cultural change that took place in the Roman Empire with the formalization of Christianity as an official religion. It is in this scenario that the notion of harmony studied in this research finds its origins, because all the way covered by the new religion points to the need for a theorization of the relations between State and Church. The position defended in this work is that a set of ideas is found in Augustine that contains a reflection on how Christianity could offer structuring means for the maintenance and consolidation of the social order and peace, not only for the Roman State, but for any people open to the divine precepts. This perspective arises from specific situations experienced by the Bishop of Hippo, namely: the donatist question, the plundering of Rome in 410 and the decadence of the Empire. With realities such as these, which pointed to imperial disintegration and a division of the Church, Augustine proposes a change of values capable of making all people live well on earth. To this end, the philosopher divides the whole of humanity into two groups, namely the earthly city (which serves the desires) and the heavenly city (which serves God), showing the leading role of the second group in better managing the goods sufficient for the construction and maintenance of temporal peace. Moreover, an element present in the Christian doctrine and coined by Saint Paul, namely, charitas, makes the heavenly city have a potential substratum to promote union and collective responsibility. Thus, when the divine precepts are used in what establishes and defines the State, namely concord, it can be transformed into a reality that prioritizes something that all humans desire: earthly peace. Thus, the fundamental consensus must be guided by the search for social order in the light of eternal law, which offers the most effective means for the ordering of society, even in the coercive sense. Moreover, since temporal peace is the desire of an agreement crowd, it has the power to determine the forms of government and laws. In this way, the developments resulting from concord will lead to the thesis that the power of a state resides in it and depends on it to be just.

    This dissertation aims at examining teleology and morality in the context of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The present work aims to argue about the possibility of a practical teleology, as well as the possible connection with morality in the first Critique, so that this purpose is possible the configuration of this work follows the following structure: in the first chapter, a distinction is made between the understanding and the reason. In the second chapter the goal is to reconstruct the argumentation that bases the teleology understood as theoretical to the molds drawn from the Critique. Finally, the third and final chapter carries the purpose of analyzing the possibility of a practical teleology grounding the theme of morality in the context of the Critique of Pure Reason. In this way, the work tries to justify that it is possible to think a teleology with practical ends in the inaugural work of the critical period of this author, allowing to think other aspects of the kantian thing to which its ethics refers.

     The Epicurean par’hemâs (our power) signifies the human power to know, deliberate and act freely. The notion of par’hemâs separate fundamentally the Epicurean atomism of Pre-Socratic atomism and is requisite for the Epicurean elaborations. This thesis is an interpretation of Epicurean philosophy, starting of analysis of Epicureans texts and bibliographic research. The aim’s work is show an interpretation of epicureanism starting for the notion of par’hemâs as basic component of Epicurus’ thoughts, presenting your meaning, aspects and function in the Epicurus’ doctrinal set. This thesis is divided into three chapters and start emphasizing the meaning, aspects and relevance of Epicurean par’hemâs. The second chapter considers the par’hemâs primordial function in the reformulation of Pre-Socratic atomism and how this notion articulate the Epicurean philosophy parts. Lastly, the notions of limit, unlimited and variation are highlights for the distinction's assimilation enunciated for Epicurus between chance, necessity and par’hemâs. In conclusion, the Epicurean appreciation about the cognition power, deliberative and causal power integrate the basis of Epicurean criticism of the first atomists and are the starting point and articulating factor of Epicurus’ doctrinal set.

This research seeks to investigate Werner Heisenberg's (1901-1976) conceptual interpretation around the problem of objectivity of quantum phenomena, that is, around the ancient metaphysical problem, which goes back to Greek philosophy, of investigating the last constituents of nature, the which, in Heisenberg's case, means to inquire into the philosophical-ontological meaning of the twenty-five elementary particles known in his time. Heisenberg defends the idea that elementary particles are ultimately mathematical forms that energy must take in order to become matter, which approximates his interpretation to the way Plato conceived pure or eido forms. Our research seeks to problematize Heisenberg's idealistic interpretation, and to discuss the various facets that are involved and implicated in his idealistic philosophical position. Finally, we defend the idea of the existence of an internal tension between the postures of the philosopher Heisenberg that defends an approximation with Plato's forms, to the problem of the objectivity of quantum phenomena, and the physicist Heisenberg who indirectly accepts a material objective background inherent in the quantum phenomena. We further argue that Heisenberg's strategy of overcoming this internal tension between matter and form is what we call Heisenberg's pragmatic atitude, which is to, simultaneously, preserve his epistemological-positivist attitude within quantum physics and his ontological-metaphysical impulse within of philosophy.

      The theme of evil in Kantian philosophy stems from its approach to morality whose concept of evil, in short, is to go against the moral law, although evil is in the performance of an action that is not a moral action, since the moral law to achieve the highest possible good through us. Kant objectively approaches evil in his work, Religion within the Boundaries of bare Reason, 1793, and for this he presents it on three levels: the evil of weakness, the evil of impurity and malignity. However, it indicates the concept of a fourth level that would not be possible, namely a diabolical will. Weakness would be a penchant for an action that goes against our own maxims, being weak and acting inversely to the moral law. The impurity is in a correct action that, however, is not based on the moral law. Malice would be the decision to do evil, having selfish motives and intentions in front of the moral law. But the fourth level of evil, which for Kant would not be possible to exist, consists in a malign action in which a purely devilish will is established. Evil in this sense, diabolical, proposes its desire from a natural corruption of the will. Kant presents this concept, but understands that it is not possible, since human actions of this kind of evil would be justified in reason itself, since such evil would be the disposition of spirit admitting as a motive evil as evil in its own maxim. Since Kant understands that man does not attain to the condition of a diabolic will, the present research seeks to investigate why in Kant the diabolical evil (in the sense of innate inhumanity or a natural pleasure in evil) would not be possible. Starting from the key concepts that discusses morality in Kant, such as freedom, categorical imperative, will, intention, good and evil, we intend to analyze the impossibility of this pure evil in human nature.

     Cette dissertassion vise à exposer, analyser et identifier les limites de la conception de la dignité humaine, définie par Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), ainsi que de vérifier les développements actuels de ce concept. Étroitement liée à la notion de liberté, la dignité qui nous est attribuée par l'auteur exalte à la fois notre autonomie et nous maintient inévitablement liés à des critères moraux soulignés par une supposée vérité divine. La relation que P établit entre la liberté et la vérité révèle sa position sur les rôles de la rhétorique et de la philosophie, mais en outre, certaines de ses opinions formulées au sein de cette relation ont aussi des répercussions sur certains problèmes sociaux. Toutes ces questions sont développées et approfondies, notamment à partir du Discours sur la dignité de l'homme, dans lequel l'auteur développe le concept en perspective et, de manière complémentaire, de l'analyse de trois correspondances, envoyées par Pico, Ermolao Barbaro et Philipp Melanchthon, dans lequel les auteurs discutent le choc entre la rhétorique et la philosophie.

      The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the relationship between the concepts of unsociable sociability and teleology in Kantian practical philosophy. This analysis is based primarily on texts such as the Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784) and the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment (1790). For Kant, to think sociability unsociable from a teleological perspective is to realize that nature does nothing in vain. Since it has endowed man with reason and a dynamic and antagonistic human nature, he must develop his dispositions which aim at the use of reason and thus corroborate so that the terminal end of rational beings becomes effective in the world. This is nothing more than man himself under moral laws, that is, the purpose proposed by the teleological perspective is morality. Therefore, to expose this positioning the argumentation of the dissertation is divided into three chapters. The first objective is to analyze the concept of unsociable sociability and its dimensions. The second exposes the concept of teleology in its theoretical aspect, just as teleology thinks in its practical aspect, and finally, the third chapter, is responsible for analyzing the relationship between social antagonism and practical teleology giving focus on the discipline unsociable sociability through law and education.

In the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV), especially in the opening of Transcendental Dialectic, Kant asserts that there is in human reason a "natural and inevitable illusion" that urges it to go beyond the limits of possible experience, taking subjective principles as objectives. This illusion is called "transcendental illusion" and is based on its dynamics pure reason. The present dissertation aims to discuss and elucidate this topic of Kantian theoretical philosophy, to describe its particularities, to contribute it in the critical-transcendental system, and, finally, to reveal its importance in this framework. For this goal, this work is divided into three main chapters, each endowed with subsections, in which the theme is discussed in detail. In the first chapter, called Prolegomena to the theme of transcendental illusion, it is considered the immediate intertext of this illusion, namely the Transcendental Dialectic, and why Kant understands this section of the KrV as "logic of illusion." In addition, a hermeneutic evaluation of Schein, a term designating the illusion, as well as the distinctions between the empirical, logical and transcendental illusion, made by Kant, is adduced. In the second chapter, titled The Transcendental Illusion in the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV), this theme is specifically approached from its definition and basic characterizations, going through a textual analysis about the nature and inevitability of this illusion, as well as its relation with ideas of reason. In the last chapter, named The epistemological importance of the transcendental illusion, it is sought to understand the relevance of this topic of Kantian critical-theoretical philosophy in epistemological terms. Thus, the positive and negative roles of the transcendental illusion are addressed and, finally, a heuristic solution is offered. This will deal with the details of this problem and will lead them to the constitutive formatting of the dynamics of reason, taking into account the roles previously highlighted in the epistemological field, without ceasing to offer justifications for the act of presiding over new knowledge and the eloquent inventive capacity of reason.

The current approach presents as a theme "The Ethics of Silence in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", delimiting as the central point the proposal of silence regarding ethics, from the analysis of proposition 7 that ratifies the discussion about 'shutting down' Which can not be said. It is intended to reinforce that in writing the Tractatus Wittgenstein did not propose a discussion only logic, but also with a very strong ethical character, fact proven by the experience of the metaphysical subject that in turn presents the ethics to the world, or more precisely presents the ethics in the The world. In order to do so, an analysis of Wittgenstein's first philosophy will be produced considering the relation between the central terms evidenced by the author, namely, language, proposition, figuration, reality, world, state of affairs, case, subject, will, and therefore ethics. In this way we will see the unfolding of the Wittgenstenian philosophy of the Tractatus and its influence on the construction of ethics in the mystical or transcendental sense defended by the author.

     What we call the problem of logical constants is a attempt to afford a non-arbitrary criteria for distinguish the realm of logical expressions from non-logical ones. Traditionally the expression of logical vocabulary were viewed as responsible for the validity of arguments. In this tradition negation (~), conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨), implication (→), the universal (∀) and existencial (∃) quantifiers were considered members of the privileged set of logical constants. But there is a large dispute about which others expressions should be introduced in this list. Our goal is to investigate one of these cases, namely, the disputes about the logicality of identity (=). We note that in disputes about identity the arguments are mainly couched in a representationalistic way. Then, we argue that if we give up this assumption is possible to defend the logicality of identity. To do that we approach the problem trough the so called inferential characterizations. In such a approach rules of inference are used to expose the logical behaviour of a logical constant. In particular, we will follow Popper (1946), and Dosen (1989). We use his ideas jointly with some of Humberstone e Townsend (1994) to expose in which conditions we could give a adequate answear to the problem of identity as a logical constant.

    The aim of this work is to analyze the notion and possibility of happiness proposed by German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. This research is based on a study of his writings, especially The World as Will and Representation, volume 1, and Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life. It also considers some critics from the Brazilian tradition of Schopenhauer studies. Proceeding from Schopenhauer’s thinking, this study offers an analysis of the understanding that life is suffering, investigates happiness through the satisfaction of desires, addresses the question of overcoming suffering through denial of the Will, and discusses happiness vis-à-vis the wisdom of life. The philosopher postulates that everyone suffers in whichever situation they find themselves: for, to live is to suffer. The source of endless suffering is the essence of the world itself; and it is this essence that Schopenhauer understands as the Will. According to him, the Will is a self-discordant, insatiable essence; and this conflicting characteristic expresses itself in each individual. Therefore, suffering is a manifestation of the Will. It is the halting of the Will, a blockage in which the Will prevents itself from achieving its ends in individuals. However, we can realize the overcoming of suffering by denial of the Will, an act by which some individuals no longer choose to affirm life through the renunciation of pleasure. We can also identify the possibility of achieving a happy and pleasant life, one that is understood as wise. Thus arises the question of understanding prospective notions of happiness, as well as the possibility of being happy in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, since even though he understands life as continuous affliction, he presents conditions that are indicative of happiness. Moreover, we can observe that happiness is understood in a negative way, that is, it is just the momentary absence of suffering. According to Schopenhauer, happiness does not appear as the acquisition of contentment or pleasure. We can still observe a state of overcoming suffering through denial of the Will, a state in which the individual becomes indifferent to all ailments. Further, we can realize that through knowledge of the wisdom of life, which is an acquisition of a character, people gain an understanding of how to behave in their lives, thereby allowing them to live as minimally unhappily as possible. This way of living produces the happiness presented in Schopenhauer’s eudemonology, according to which happiness is something that can be achieved in a processual way.

     The aim of this work will be to investigate how Kant explains or grounds moral action in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. Indeed, we can say that the moral action in the first is grounded on spontaneity of action give by freedom. Therefore, to show these points, the following path will be followed: in 2.1 we will see the emergence of a new conception of morality. In 2.2 we will see that the new conception interprets the morality as autonomy. In section 3 we will examine elements that characterize the nature of moral action in the GMS and in the Kantian moral philosophy. In point 3.1 we will see that Kant sustains moral action in the third section of the GMS in the idea that when we think ourselves as free we are transposed into an intelligible world, possible for freedom. We will also speak in this same subsection of the problems related to the vicious circle, the deduction of the moral law in the GMS as well as the distinction between a sensible and intelligible world. In point 4 on the factum of reason we will show the factum as being the consciousness of the moral law and as not being able to deduction. We will show that Kant sustains the moral action in the KpV on the ideia of such factum. We will also introduce in this same topic the two possible interpretations of the factum of reason. In the next subsection in 4.1 we will show Beck’s (1960) interpretation according to which we have in KpV what could formally correspond to a deduction of the moral principle. In 4.2 we will see Allison’s (1990) interpretation according to which such factum of reason can be understood as factum of reason, that is, as evidence that pure reason is practical. In 4.3 we will show that, unlike Beck (1960), Almeida (1998) will deny that a deduction of the moral law in the KpV is possible. In fact, Almeida (1998), will conclude because of this impossibility, the sense of factum of reason that would be imposed would be the cognitivist (or intuitionist) sense. In this same subsection, in view of the cognitivist interpretation we will expose Beck’s (1981) interpretation in which he rejects the cognitivist point of view. In subsection 4.4 we will see freedom as a condition of moral in the KpV and, finally, we will focus our attention on the moral feeling in the KpV.

      The present work intends to present the meaning of ethics that appears veiled in the writings of Karl Marx. Although this author has not developed an elaborate conception of ethics and has rejected any philosophical link on this issue, Marx understands that this category is not capable of overcoming the structural contradictions of capitalist society. For this reason, that ethics is not regarded as the central object of its social theory appearing in a dispersed way throughout its works without, therefore, to develop it fully. But the absence of a treatise on ethics in Marx does not imply the absence of ethics. But when Marx proposes a radical modification of bourgeois society it becomes impossible to think that such a social transformation is not accompanied by an ethical perspective. All of his work, that is, the texts of youth and maturity, have an ethical significance, on which rests the purpose of this research - to unveil this meaning. Thus, the basic thesis of this study concentrates on the analysis of the ethics derived from the social existence itself with all its material conditioning, being inserted in a real context and in a historical-social structure. Starting from this assumption, an approach of the meaning of ethics in the theory of Marx is contemplated following two opposite planes: A critic and another derived from the class struggle. That is, the first plane is based on morality from its social and class determination, having the ideological device as an instrument capable of hiding the interests of the ruling class in producing a moral forged by the false consciousness of reality. The second plan is derived from the class struggle existing in capitalist society, which is aligned with the interests of the oppressed majority and exploited by the system, so this scope of ethics puts into perspective such values as solidarity, collectivism, freedom, respect and the courage to fight to subvert the dominant order.

     In this work, we intend to approach the concept of praxis in Marx, this concept corresponds to the main core in Marxian theory, because it is from him and with him that arise a theory that captures the human world in its real movement as well as directions for action immediately practical for the transformation of the world. Our intention is to understand the main methodological factors contained in materialism-historical-dialectic, this will allow us to think specific historical times, notably, classical Greece and Renaissance, so we can understand what was the consciousness of the praxis that hovered in the thought of each of these Epochs. In addition, with the application of the Marxian method we can note the material-historical-dialectical justifications that underlie such a view of praxis. Tracing the historical consciousness of praxis will necessarily lead us to Marx, who, living in the moment when the material transformation of the world allowed him to see clearly the determinations that shaped society, managed to break with the consciousness of the praxis that preceded him. Moreover, not only this, too has been able to indicate the path of revolution for the transformation of the world contained in revolutionary social praxis, a path we can use today.

      We have the pretension, with this work, to examine Transhumanism, a philosophical and cultural movement that longs for the overcoming of the human organic condition as a result of the exponential techno-scientific advance, expressed into a human enhancement that comprises a broad spectrum of human action. For this, in view of a historical rescue of its archimedean points or roots, we assert that the movement can be understood in accordance with the two technoscientific traditions, Promethean and Faustic, both constituted in the light of Hermínio Martin's philosophy and sociology, by peculiar traits. The first is in a technoscientific structure impelled by the idea that, through reason, we can modify the world for something better, to morph it in the desire to obtain the human good, whose point of culmination is Humanism; the second expresses an excessive, unbridled character, a hubris that establishes a fissure in the Humanist ideal. We hold, in addition, under the prism of Hermínio Martins and Victor Ferkiss, that the movement resonates a kind of "neognosticism" or "technological gnosticism", since it promotes, to some extent, a transcendent high-tech salvationism, in detriment of pure organicity that we are constituent. We also want to make it evident that the Transhumanist movement does not exhaust itself in monolithic terms, given that it is expressed in disparate nuances of the political spectrum, adapting itself, bringing new lines of discussion and focuses of analysis and proposition, inscribed in two categories: Promethean Transhumanism and Faustic Transhumanism. Finally, in elucidating the exponential development of the demiurgic sciences, we aim to establish ways for a clear understanding that, notwithstanding the Transhumanism being permeated by the risk of intensifying the global injustice, by flexibilizing the natural human constitution in favor of an abstract human, therefore potentially dangerous, movement can be conceived as a way to solve countless problems of the human sphere. And in the face of the impacts from the advancement of these technologies, we aspire to, finally, highlight how colossal is the relevance of this discussion in the philosophic and academic field.

  The present work consist on discussing about the set of works of the second phase of Jurgen Habermas in relation to one of the aspects of his political philosophy, emphasizing the relationship between law and morality in the design of the democratic rule of law. Since, for Habermas there cannot be confusion between the spheres of morality and law, under penalty of establishing an irrationality of the system on the whole. And this means that you cannot exacerbate or to an absolute technicality, and not to a superposition about the complete form of values as to the philosopher, the moral and the right should complement it by a political rationale of the Democracy exercise. Thus, a reflection on the rehabilitation of practical philosophy will be possible for the resolution of the existing conflict regarding the inclusion of the subject in democratic states, multiculturalism and religion. Thus, these dilemmas added to the various problems that come in the discussions of modern states, this dissertation attempts to answer how is the complementation of law and morality in the design of the democratic rule of law? And as the legitimation of law in democracy it is possible.

  The family of arguments called “Slingshot Arguments” are a family of arguments underlying the fregean view that if sentences have reference at all, their references are their truth-values. Usually seen as a kind of collapsing argument, the slingshot consists in proving that, once you suppose that there are some items that are references of sentences (as facts or situations, for example), these items collapse into just two items: The True and The False. This is a dissertation about the slingshot which is dubbed Gödel’s slingshot. Gödel argued that there is a deep connection between these arguments and definite descriptions. More precisely, according to Gödel, if one adopts Russell’s interpretation of definite descriptions (which clashes with Frege’s view that definite descriptions are singular terms) it is possible to evade the slingshot. We challenge Gödel’s view in two manners, first by presenting a slingshot even with a russellian interpretation of definite descriptions and second by presenting a slingshot even when we change from singular terms to plural terms in the light of new developments of the so called Plural Logic. The text is divided in three chapters, in the first chapter we present the discussion between Russell and Frege regarding definite descriptions, in the second chapter we present Gödel’s position and reconstructions of Gödel’s argument and in the third chapter we prove our slingshot argument for Plural Logic. In light of this results we conclude that we can recovered slingshots even with a russellian interpretation of definite descriptions or in a context of Plural Logic.

    This work will discuss the relationship between aesthetics and politics in the work of the French philosopher Jacques Rancière, based mainly on the concept of distribution of the sensible. For Rancière there is a common field that joins these two spheres of human knowledge, the primary aesthetics referred to an a priori of sensitivity. In this sense, both art and politics can intervene in this sensory fabric, reconfiguring the distribution of the sensible dissensual way. There is, according to the author, a dichotomy in the field of distribution of the sensible, two logics that organize or redistribute the activities, times and spaces. On the one hand, a logic of consensus and good order of locations and on an other hand, a logic that works on the frontiers of domination, creating a disruptive sensible. From this common ground of distribution of the sensible, Rancière put in discussion how the arts affect the fabric of the distribution and how to get a political character for this reason. The aim of this work is to present and discuss how it is possible to effective the emancipation from the practice of subjects as workers or artists, thinking the relationship between aesthetics and politics.

   This work examines the possibility that Socrates is attacking a straw man in the Theaetetus, 152a, when he explains Protagoras's dictum that “man is the measure of all things” as embracing a vulgar form of relativism which takes knowledge as being merely perception. It begins with Leo Strauss’s suggestion that the great writers of the past made use of a peculiar technique, that he names metaphorically as “writing between the lines,” aiming to protect their heterodox views from political persecution while expressing openly other views that conform to generally accepted opinion. It seeks to demonstrate that Strauss’s suggestion is a valid one and that the writing between the lines was recognized throughout most Philosophy’s history and only recently forgotten. It also seeks to clarify Strauss’s suggestion and identify a minimal set of rules to be applied to the reading of that Theaetetus’s passage. In the end, it considers that reading between the lines of the said passage can point to the conclusion that the examined hypothesis is correct and suggests a starting point from where to begin a Straussian interpretation of the dialog as a whole.

     This essay presents a study about the Gorgias dialogue, by Plato, expounding that this piece is a reflection on the Platonic criticism to sophist Rhetoric, developing the idea that it is empeiria, producer of flattery (κολακευτική). We find ambiguous elements that show that despite criticizing persuasion (πειθώ), Socrates recognizes it as an essential requisite to conduct the elenchos (ελενκος). In the dialogue, Socrates sees himself before three interlocutors, Gorgias, Polo and Callicles. The latter being his one chief tormentor. We acknowledge the dialogue in its historical-cultural context, since Rhetoric and its element of persuasion were Greek culture's constitutive inputs. We consider that Plato's intent is to rethink the sophists rhetorical and persuasive elements in order to expose the "true rhetoric", that it, Philosophy. For this, Plato makes an analysis of the persuasive rhetoric, placing before his master an exponent of the sophistry, Gorgias; and seeks to unveil its art (τέχνη). However, although we can recognize in it the necessary elements, the dialogue ends without a dialogue, since there is no persuasion on either sides. We consider that all these points will be relevant to understand persuasion (πειθώ) as one of the basic elements of Greek orality and Platonic dialectics. 

This thesis aims to analyze the concept of predestination from the Augustine of Hippo’s philosophy. Our investigation is going to start with the analysis of the sources and origins that guided the philosopher to developed of this subject. After that, we will seek the place that the concepts occupy in all his works and the relation With the Manichean and Pelagian controversies. Ultimately, we will identify what would be predestination inside of the system established for Augustine of Hippo to explain the relation between freedom of the human will and the divine sovereignty.

Suszko’s Thesis is a philosophical claim regarding the nature of many-valuedness. It was formulated by the Polish logician Roman Suszko during the middle 70s and states the existence of “only but two truth values”. The thesis is a reaction against the notion of many-valuedness conceived by Jan Łukasiewicz. Reputed as one of the modern founders of many-valued logics, Łukasiewicz considered a third undetermined value in addition to the traditional Fregean values of Truth and Falsehood. For Łukasiewicz, his third value could be seen as a step beyond the Aristotelian dichotomy of Being and non-Being. According to Suszko, Łukasiewicz’s ideas rested on a confusion between algebraic values (what sentences describe/denote) and logical values (truth and falsity). Thus, Łukasiewicz’s third undetermined value is no more than an algebraic value, a possible denotation for a sentence, but not a genuine logical value. Suszko’s Thesis is endorsed by a formal result baptized as Suszko’s Reduction, a theorem that states every Tarskian logic may be characterized by a two-valued semantics. The present study is intended as a thorough investigation  of Suszko’s thesis and its implications. The first part is devoted to the historical roots of many-valuedness and introduce Suszko’s main motivations in formulating the double character of truth-values by drawing the distinction in between algebraic and logical values. The second part explores Suszko’s Reduction and presents the developments achieved from it; the properties of two-valued semantics in comparison to many-valued semantics are also explored and discussed. Last but not least, the third part investigates the notion of logical values in the context of non-Tarskian notions of entailment; the meaning of Suszko’s thesis within such frameworks is also discussed. Moreover, the philosophical foundations for non-Tarskian notions of entailment are explored in the light of recent debates concerning logical pluralism.

O presente estudo trata de refletir sobre o lugar da verdade, no cotidiano da experiência humana. A noção de verdadeiro expressa de diferentes formas, em diferentes sistemas de pensamento, culturais e históricos, revela a não uniformidade de seus significados e a arbitrariedade de seu agrupamento sob um mesmo nome, verdade. Diante desse fato, de tantas crenças assumidas como absolutas, perguntamos junto com o historiador Jean Paul Marie Veyne, se a Verdade é apenas uma, ou muitas designadas por uma palavra homônima. Se, através de suas idéias, os homens não podem acessar um conhecimento definitivamente sólido, imutável e desenvolto das interferências de
sua condição humana (como os seus interesses e afetos), então em que sentido ele poderá reivindicar uma Verdade maior e exclusivista? Assumindo a impossibilidade de uma apreensão da realidade desse tipo, Paul Veyne desenvolve a noção de programas de verdade, crenças referenciais assumidas como cartografias que direcionam a ação e o pensamento. Defendendo, assim, a idéia de heterogeneidade e pluralidade, como elementos irredutíveis das verdades humanas. Se de um lado há na sociedade uma pluralidade de programas de verdade, de outro há uma pluralidade de crenças que é interior ao homem. Isto é, em seu modo de crer o homem também se mostra plural, pois crê em mais de um programa e em programas contrários. O pensamento de Paul Veyne não deixa de ser uma forma de cepticismo dirigida a todas as verdades antropológicas pretensamente absolutas e universais. Pois a depender do regime de crenças estudado e do momento específico de sua história,
um jogo de regras é instituído para distinguir o verdadeiro do falso.

O presente trabalho discute a profundidade e opacidade do mundo percebido no pensamento de Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) em contraposição à transparência do mundo geométrico pensado por René Descartes (1596-1650). Num primeiro momento é abordado o discurso cartesiano desenvolvido na Dióptricade Descartes,o primeiro de uma série de três discursos científicos publicados em 1637, sendo introduzidos pelo famoso Discurso do Método. Neste sentido,esta pesquisa discorre sobre a explicação mecanicista que o filósofo moderno apresenta acerca da visão, um processo que abrange a formação das imagens na retina e sua comunicação ao cérebro, bem como a posterior leitura realizada por uma mente imaterial. Discute-se a noção de imagem enquanto resultado da interpretação do espírito, pois, para Descartes, não é o olho que vê, mas sim o espírito que lê e decodifica os sinais que o corpo recebe do mundo. Noutro momento, reflete-se sobre a crítica do filósofo Maurice Merleau-Ponty ao pensamento de sobrevoo presente na Dióptrica de Descartes. Para tanto, toma-se como principal referência a terceira parte da obra O Olho e o Espírito (1961), na qual a abordagem intelectualista da visão é considerada como uma tentativa fracassada de se afastar do visível para reconstruí-lo a partir de lugar nenhum. Neste sentido, reflete-se sobre uma nova ontologia proposta por Merleau-Ponty que pensa o ser sem se afastar dos enigmas do corpo e de visão. Enigmas que manifestam uma promiscuidade entre o vidente e o visível, entre o senciente e o sensível. Desse modo, o presente trabalho discorre sobre o modo como a visibilidade foi tratada pelo filósofo contemporâneo, não como algo a ser julgado pelo espírito para obter uma real natureza das coisas, mas como uma manifestação das coisas mesmas. Por fim, esta pesquisa explora a ontologia do visível no pensamento merleaupontiano, uma ontologia que não reconstrói nem se apropria do visível por um pensamento de sobrevoo, mas que se faz a partir da própria visibilidade enquanto relação originária e incessante com a profundidade do mundo.

  This thesis intends to ponder the concepts of Justice found in The Republic’s book 1, mostly on those between excerpts 336c and 354c. It also considers the possibility that Thrasymachus’ concept of Justice – the convenience of the stronger – is a pre-Platonic view of Justice that is appropriated by Plato, who makes it valid when considering the stronger to be virtuous and oriented to the Good: such condition of the stronger can only be found on Plato’s Republic. Therefore, this thesis states that Thrasymachus may not be entirely wrong on his concept of Justice. Moreover, this thesis also considers the possibility that Justice, throughout The Republic, is harmony among the soul’s elements and the city’s.

O presente trabalho discute o pensamento político do filósofo francês Gilles Deleuze (1925 – 1995), a partir dos conceitos de menor/maior, pois, segundo eles, a filosofia de Deleuze resulta em problemáticas pertinentes para pensar a política e suas formas. Não só os conceitos de maior/menor, mas o conceito de devir, no modo de devir-menor marca a proposição, do que poderíamos dizer, uma política propriamente deleuziana. Sendo assim, o presente trabalho intenta expor a possível forma de uma tal política e de uma ética da luta a ela associada. Estudar
o pensamento político de Deleuze hoje é não abdicar de um pensamento político que reconhece as singularidades e abraça a luta política não como revolução totalizante, mas como resistência. A análise dos conceitos de maior/menor, e do devir na forma de devir-menor mostra-se como fundamental na proposição política como tal.

Considerando apenas os escritos pertencentes ao período de juventude do filósofo alemão Friedrich Nietzsche, o presente trabalho explana a crítica à modernidade a partir de um ideal de educação formulado nos primeiros anos de docência. A preocupação com a educação (Erziehung) dá-se por identificá-la como sendo o cerne dos problemas da cultura moderna. A cultura (Kultur) tem importância maior que a educação no pensamento nietzschiano por ser o solo e o termômetro da vida. Todavia, educar é o primeiro passo para se ter uma cultura fomentadora da vida. A educação consiste, para Nietzsche, em ensinar o indivíduo a pensar, de preferência com o apoio da filosofia, uma espécie de arte para criar vida. Na educação pretendida por Nietzsche, a vida toma sentido maior do que o conhecimento aprendido na escola; o conhecimento é instrumento para expressão criativa de si e da vida, o que consequentemente definirá a cultura de um povo. Cultura, assim, é o processo de recriação do conhecimento acumulado e aprendido, que por sua vez possa ser vista como uma unidade de estilo em toda expressão artística e na vida. Estando a educação imbricada com a cultura, outro conceito se faz necessário para compreendermos o pensamento educacional em Nietzsche, a saber, formação (Bildung). Em linhas gerais, Bildung está associada à imagem (bild), à imitação (Nachbildung), à forma (Gestalt), ao comportamento e ao costume. Portanto, dando mais importância para a Bildung, pois é um conceito mais amplo para a formação do homem, Nietzsche pretende para a modernidade os centros de ensino com objetivos voltados para cultivar os poucos homens que serão os exemplos dos jovens de amanhã.

A partir do debate sobre o positivismo das ciências sociais na Alemanha, Positivismusstreit, é possível estabelecer que ao longo do debate foi discutido a relação entre os fundamentos epistemológicos e as implicações na ética. O racionalismo crítico, advogado por Karl Popper e Hans Albert, e a teoria crítica de Theodor Adorno e Jürgen Habermas corroboram na rejeição ao relativismo epistemológico, analisando o surgimento das ideologias políticas que visam estabelecer uma fundamentação científica da ética, que tem como consequência a dominação da autoridade do Estado e na alienação do contexto social-histórico da opinião pública. O racionalismo crítico exclui a influência da economia, estabelecendo os fundamentos de um método dedutivo puro que seria uma ciência neutra e objetiva: a lógica situacional. Esse método alicerçado na tradição crítica do princípio da falseabilidade seria responsável pelo progresso das ciências sociais, pois distinguiria essas ciências do dogmatismo das ideologias políticas que geram ações intolerantes na sociedade. Porém, para Adorno, esse método gera a instrumentalização da razão, pois o objetivo juízo da totalidade sócio-histórica é alienado ao valor subjetivo do mercado e na venda da força de trabalho. Apesar da discordância metodológica é possível aproximar as perspectivas, pois ambas rejeitam a fundamentação científica para a ética, demonstrando que isso faria da ética uma dominação ideológica, política e econômica. Por isso, é necessário reformular a questão da relação sobre os fundamentos epistemológicos e as suas consequências nas ações práticas.

A pesquisa consiste em apresentar os conceitos e argumentos mais importantes para Cornelius Castoriadis que permitam elucidar o papel da ação política na busca pela autonomia coletiva e individual. A partir da delimitação histórico-conceitual da reflexão filosófica sobre a autonomia, demonstrar as principais críticas de Castoriadis dirigidas ao determinismo histórico, às tendências totalitárias presentes na história da filosofia e à alienação promovida pela ideologia capitalista. Para tanto, é essencial compreender as categorias usadas por ele em todo o seu percurso filosófico: sociedade, imaginação radical, imaginário social, linguagem e social-histórico. Castoriadis opõe-se a qualquer concepção da história que apele para um plano pré-determinado, seja de origem natural, racional ou divina. Ele prossegue na ideia de que cada sociedade é o resultado da permanente tensão entre sociedade instituída e sociedade instituinte, pois cada sociedade é fruto da diferença entre a sociedade particular e o imaginário social que promove sua alteração. A história é criada pela atividade teórica e prática dos homens, na dimensão chamada de social-histórico que se impõe como limite que não se pode ultrapassar mesmo sendo objeto de constante interrogação e de mudança da ação humana. Para esclarecer a noção de democracia apresentada por Castoriadis, será necessário analisar com profundidade como o imaginário radical está inserido na formação do indivíduo e na instituição da sociedade, bem como, elucidar o modo como se relacionam os conceitos de autonomia, heteronomia, liberdade, igualdade e justiça, explicitando em qual contexto aparecem dentro da obra de Castoriadis.

O objetivo desta dissertação é desenvolver uma análise sobre a ideia da imortalidade da alma a partir das Enéadas de Plotino pela compreensão do discurso da alma como eterna, una-múltipla e em busca da simplicidade com o Uno diante da temporalidade do corpo múltiplo. Para tanto, iniciamos tentando analisar suscintamente as hipóstases plotinianas (O Uno, o Espírito e a Alma) para melhor estabelecer as bases do pensamento de Plotino ao abordar o tema da ideia da alma e sua imortalidade. Procuramos examinar a epistéme do pensamento de Plotino e sua dialética no intuito de desenvolvermos uma compreensão das relações existentes entre as matérias sensível e inteligível e as formas. Assim, desenvolve-se nas Enéadas de Plotino o papel fundamental do Logos e dos Lógoi na formação da alma. Analisamos também na processão (proódos) e no retorno (epístrophé) as implicações dos aspectos da eternidade sobre a purificação da alma na temporalidade do corpo. Procuramos, por fim, na ideia da imortalidade da alma pelo conhecimento de si mesma a imortalidade na simplicidade do Uno, isto é, o momento último da busca do autoconhecimento pelo esquecimento de si para está só com o Uno: o “despoja-te de tudo” (Aphele pánta). 

Compreendida em um projeto de transvaloração dos valores, a alegria é um dos temas centrais do pensamento de Friedrich Nietzsche e Clément Rosset. Contrapondo-se à tradição metafísica – que a moraliza e a despoja de sua força ao pensá-la como “felicidade”, avaliada, por sua vez, como meta vinculada à virtude e à racionalidade –, estes pensadores propõem uma perspectiva em que a alegria deixa de apontar para uma instância ultramundana e volta-se para a terra, para o corpo. Para além das oposições de valores constitutivas da dogmática metafísica, a alegria e o sofrimento são concebidos como elementos que não se excluem, antes se complementam como fundamentos de uma sabedoria trágica caracterizada por uma ciência gaia(ta), consubstanciada no riso e na amizade. A partir de uma incondicional fidelidade ao real expressa nas fórmulas do amor fati (Nietzsche) e da aprovação irrestrita da existência (Rosset), a alegria é então entrevista como impulso vital, a força maior, a força plástica que incita à criação artística: a alegria de criança brincando.

A presente pesquisa trata da constituição do sujeito religioso-moral no pensamento de Freud, partindo da questão da religião, enquanto um dos vários espaços de concreção do indivíduo moral. Buscamos desenhar esse sujeito a partir de alguns elementos teóricos do pensamento freudiano, desde sua ideia geral de origem da civilização, moralidade e religião a elementos mais específicos que dizem respeito ao sujeito individual, ou seja, ao psiquismo. Em seu núcleo, há a ideia de complexo de Édipo, que é estrutural na obra do pai da psicanálise, e esta, em relação à constituição do sujeito, dá-se partindo de dois períodos centrais: o primeiro, que antecede o complexo de Édipo, se dá na relação primária da criança com a mãe, entendendo-se essa relação como sendo narcisista. O segundo momento, que se dá no início propriamente dito do complexo de Édipo e, consequentemente, da estruturação do superego, se estrutura a partir do “corte” que se dá no complexo edipiano, ao qual a criança é submetida, gerando como consequência a perda e o desamparo da mesma frente a este mundo, mas isso também gera nela um jogo contraditório de sentimentos; por um lado, ver no pai um objeto de ódio, já que ele foi o responsável pela quebra da sua relação “primária” com a mãe e, por outro, aquele passa a ser objeto de admiração. Mas essa admiração não é pelo pai em si; ela se configura como um desejo narcísico, já que o que a criança deseja é “reconquistar” seu lugar na relação com a mãe. Dado o fim do complexo de Édipo e com ele a estruturação do superego, o que o sujeito mais pretende é retornar à relação recalcada com a mãe, ao seu narcisismo primário. Daí surge o sentimento religioso e a consciência moral. O primeiro apresenta-se como via que possibilita o retorno à relação primária, e o segundo, uma vez que surge do conflito edipiano, funciona também como um meio de a criança fazer por onde não perder o “amor” da mãe e do pai, que se estende para aqueles a quem ela transfere a imagem deles.

Esta investigação tem como objetivo reconstruir e explicitar o argumento proposto por Peter Singer para justificar o princípio de igual consideração de interesses (PICI). O PICI é o princípio normativo básico segundo o qual as pessoas devem considerar igualmente os interesses de todos os seres sencientes afetados ao tomarem uma decisão moral. É o vínculo que Singer estabelece entre a universalizabilidade e o princípio de igual consideração de interesses que se constitui em uma razão convincente para justificá-lo. A universalizabilidade consiste na exigência de desconsiderar as diferenças numéricas, de colocar-se no lugar do outro e de consideração igual pelas preferências, interesses, desejos e ideais dos afetados. O problema consiste na forma de estabelecer consistentemente este vínculo sendo que ele não é analítico. Singer ao vincular a universalizabilidade e o princípio normativo estabelece a forma e o conteúdo da sua teoria. No primeiro capítulo, introduzimos a discussão que será desenvolvida nesta dissertação. No segundo capítulo, apresentamos o panorama histórico-filosófico no qual Singer inicia suas investigações. No terceiro capítulo, apresentamos a sua crítica ao naturalismo, intuicionismo, relativismo e subjetivismo simples e, por fim, ao emotivismo. No quarto capítulo, expomos a concepção do prescritivismo universal proposta por R. M. Hare. O prescritivismo universal indica, para Singer, uma forma consistente para estabelecer o vínculo entre a universalizabilidade e o PICI. Apontamos, também, as críticas feitas por J. L. Mackie e pelo próprio Singer ao prescritivismo universal. Na segunda parte do capítulo, apresentamos resumidamente alguns pontos centrais da concepção clássica do utilitarismo e uma possível relação com a teoria de Singer. No quinto capítulo, apresentamos a tese de Singer sobre a origem da ética e sobre a universalizabilidade como uma característica necessária do ponto de vista da ética, bem como o argumento que é desenvolvido para estabelecer o PICI. No sexto capítulo, expomos as principais distinções que caracterizam o PICI. Encerramos no sétimo capítulo com uma discussão sobre as razões apresentadas por Singer para que uma pessoa oriente a sua vida de acordo com o ponto de vista da ética. Essa estrutura permite-nos explicitar as principais ideias do autor naquilo que concerne aos fundamentos teóricos da sua filosofia moral.

Esta dissertação aborda a ideia de progresso histórico sobre uma perspectiva moral, a qual nos é permitido pensar através da perspectiva teleológica kantiana. O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar uma possível leitura sobre a noção de progresso na filosofia kantiana da história, a qual ultrapassa os limites de uma leitura meramente jurídica, fundamentando-se na noção moral de dever e, se consolidando como uma leitura inserida no sistema crítico, não só porque a noção de progresso é concebida como necessariamente subjetivo, como dever, sobretudo, por ser concebido como um ideal indeterminado. No primeiro capítulo, apresenta-se uma vinculação entre a filosofia prática e a filosofia da história, através da leitura do ensaio de 1784, onde é possível contemplar um progresso histórico moral, baseado na noção do dever de trabalhar para o desenvolvimento de todas as disposições naturais dos seres humanos. No segundo capítulo, apresenta-se, a partir do “Apêndice a Dialética Transcendental”, a legitimidade a priori do princípio de conformidade a fim, também se demonstra como esta noção teleológica não resulta de um interesse simplesmente especulativo da razão, mas para satisfazer o interesse da razão pura prática e, portanto, mostra-se como a noção de teleologia determina a concepção de progresso moral na história da humanidade.

O presente trabalho versará sobre como os três temas centrais da metafísica tradicional, a saber, Deus, o homem e o mundo, são repensados pela especulação filosófica do cardeal alemão Nicolau de Cusa (1401-1464). Devido à abrangência dessa temática, nossa dissertação terá sempre como ponto de partida e referencial constante o livro que o filósofo escreveu em 1450, Idiota. De mente, segundo escrito que compõe a série de diálogos do Idiota (Idiotae libri), e cuja discussão se desenvolve em torno ao tema da mente humana. A partir do diálogo De mente construiremos nossa reflexão tomando algumas questões e fundamentações teóricas apresentadas no Idiota. De sapientia e no De docta ignorantia, estendendo-a a pouco mais que isso. De acordo com Nicolau de Cusa a mente humana, em seu caráter criativo à imagem da mente divina, transcende as considerações puramente funcionais que lhe podemos atribuir, isto é, no que se refere à sua natureza cognitiva e ao seu papel epistemológico. Para além desses aspectos, o cusano entende a humana mens como um ponto de articulação dos outros dois temas que protagonizam a sua metafísica: Deus e o mundo. Nesse contexto, através dos conceitos de complicatio-explicatio e imago, assim como da intercessão entre o tema do homem imago Dei e o motivo do microcosmo, pretendemos apresentar a filosofia cusana.

O presente trabalho centra esforços na questão do ser-com os outros debatido na filosofia de Martin Heidegger. Para tanto, toma como base os seus escritos mais exponenciais, principalmente os seus excertos das obras Ser e Tempo e Introdução à Filosofia, nos quais o tema é pormenorizado. A linha de desenvolvimento no estudo feito consiste em perscrutar a ligação existente entre a questão do Dasein para com os outros e como essa relação pode ser tomada em seus aspectos de autenticidade e inautenticidade. Para tanto, é necessário tangenciar outros elementos filosóficos atinentes a essa relação de alteridade, analisando fenomenologicamente como o modo de ser-no-mundo do Dasein o influencia em seus termos decisórios mais profundos, os quais o direcionam para a autenticidade ou para a inautenticidade. Diante desse contexto decisório do Dasein, observa-se também a forma de compartilhar a verdade de acordo com a interação com os outros, e como esse modo de ser singulariza toda a estrutura ontológica de compreensão do homem segundo esse elemento integrativo do qual ele não pode escapar, ser-com os outros é uma situação existencial da qual o Dasein não se pode furtar a vivê-la. O trabalho também contempla a aparente contradição do Dasein estar sempre lançado no modo de ser impessoal na lida com os outros, explicando como é possível haver autenticidade (bem como também inautenticidade) nas interações com os outros, sem que haja uma regra definida previamente para tais formas de se relacionar com eles.

O objetivo geral dessa dissertação é analisar os aspectos metafísicos da “mecânica racional” de Isaac Newton, esclarecendo, pelo discurso científico e filosófico, os elementos principais da teoria newtoniana de uma entidade infinitamente racional por trás dos fenômenos de toda a natureza, percebendo Newton como certo empirista que aceita deduções metafísicas; um filósofo-cientista. Os objetivos específicos podem ser assim enumerados: a) breve apresentação do desenvolvimento da ciência moderna, desde os pré-socráticos, buscando compreender a conjectura histórica que possibilitou o surgimento da mecânica newtoniana; b) apresentação dos elementos da metodologia científica e filosófica, visando à compreensão de certa “metodologia newtoniana”, compreendendo como essa metodologia específica consegue apresentar aspectos empíricos, matemáticos, filosóficos e religiosos em comunhão; c) compreender, a partir dos conceitos newtonianos, tanto o papel concernente ao homem no mundo quanto às “noções nocionais” de massa, espaço, tempo e movimento, para que possamos analisar e compreender certos aspectos metafísicos na física de Newton; d) apresentar os conceitos newtonianos referentes ao éter, para entendermos porque ele assume necessariamente características metafísicas e de mediação entre os corpos; e) apresentar e compreender os fatores que levam o empirista Newton assumir a religião na sua mecânica, bem como, a existência e funções de Deus na natureza, para objetar o conteúdo maior de sua metafísica. Posteriormente, descobrimos elementos metafísicos na sua mecânica clássica, elementos que confirmam em sua ciência conceitos como Deus Criador e Preservador das leis naturais. Por fim, analisaremos a importância de Newton para a metafísica moderna e a herança da filosofia da ciência para a ciência contemporânea, refletindo sobre a possibilidade de um argumento teleológico da natureza.

O seguinte trabalho consiste na interpretação e análise do problema da indução sob uma visão fundamentada em teoria de conjuntos e teoria de probabilidades como base para a solução de suas implicações filosóficas negativas relativas aos sistemas de lógica indutiva de maneira geral.

Devido à importância do problema e aos desenvolvimentos recentes nos referidos campos de conhecimento (início do século 20), bem como às relações visíveis entre eles e o processo de inferência indutivo, tem-se aberto um campo de possibilidades relativamente inexplorado e promissor.

O ponto-chave para o estudo consiste na modelagem do processo de aquisição de informação usando conceitos de teoria de conjuntos, seguido por um tratamento usando teoria de probabilidades.

Ao longo do estudo foi possível identificar, como obstáculos principais à justificação probabilística, tanto o problema da definição do conceito de probabilidade quanto do de racionalidade, além da sutil conexão entre ambos. Essa constatação permitiu um maior cuidado na escolha do critério de racionalidade a ser considerado no intuito de viabilizar o tratamento do problema por meio de situações-exemplo específicas, mas sem a perda de suas características originais, de modo que as conclusões obtidas possam ser estendidas a casos clássicos como o relativo à dúvida sobre a continuidade do nascer do sol.

Neste trabalho abordaremos o hóspede como personagem e método na obra platônica, com destaque para os diálogos O Sofista e O Político de Platão, e como essa noção de hóspede conduz ao inquérito do que seria um sofista, um político e um filósofo. Começaremos com a teorização dos possíveis significados para estrangeiro aos quais ‘hóspede’ pode estar ligado ou não, mostrando como o problema da recepção das diferenças pode ser pensado na obra platônica pelo prisma do estrangeiro. Analisaremos especificamente o diálogo O Sofista, apresentando a proposta do diálogo enquanto uma busca pelas diferenças, tanto no ramo ontológico quanto na definição do sofista. Da mesma forma, analisaremos o diálogo O Político, mostrando as relações que esse diálogo guarda com o seu anterior (O Sofista), no sentido de continuar uma investigação e mostrar como o político deve ser uma figura de conciliação dos problemas. Apresentaremos uma proposta visando pensar o último termo da investigação lançada em O Sofista: o Filósofo como uma proposta que Platão demonstra através de relações durante toda a sua obra e não apenas num diálogo, concluindo o trabalho com as relações que os textos nos deixaram para pensar o Filósofo a partir do prisma da hospitalidade.

O estudo da neuroética situa-se no campo da ética filosófica, onde razão e emoção fazem parte do jogo das decisões morais, constituindo-se elementos importantes dessa analise. Os campos de atuação da neurociência e da neuroética vem oportunizando discussões acerca das mudanças conceituações não só nas ciências médicas, mas também nas ciências sociais, educação e filosofia. Daí, nos determos nas emergências conceituais, no desenvolvimento técnico, tecnológico e biotecnológico, que compõem o repertório do avanço da ciência e dos dilemas morais que lhes são inerentes. Discussão que nos remete aos procedimentos adotados nesses campos de estudos, dado ao fato destes não afetarem somente a vida dos indivíduos submetidos aos procedimentos acadêmicos e/ou tratamentos, mas a sociedade como um todo. A neurociência como qualquer ciência encontra-se submetida a princípios morais e éticos, sobretudo, aos que dizem respeito aos processos de tomada de decisão nos estudos, intervenções ou manipulações envolvendo seres vivos, processo no qual os cientistas assumem responsabilidades e riscos. Para discutir e analisar este tema nos apoiamos como referencia principal, dentre outras, as teses de Emmanuel Kant e Jonh Stuart Mill acerca do dever e da utilidade.  

Esta dissertação apresenta uma interpretação a respeito das considerações críticas do filósofo alemão Friedrich Nietzsche sobre a modernidade, mais precisamente a crítica de Nietzsche à verdade, à moral-cristã e à democracia por ele desenvolvidas em Além do bem e do Mal. Nietzsche analisa atentamente os pormenores da modernidade, faz um diagnóstico do homem moderno e encontra o sinal da decadência. Para ele, a decadência, que invade a vida e a cultura moderna e enseja o surgimento de homens domesticados na sua ação e nivelados em seus desejos e anseios, foi provocada pelo modo de valorar do homem moderno que, por sua vez, se realiza a partir de crenças metafísicas, principalmente, a crença metafísica na verdade, que surgiu com a filosofia socrático-platônica. Por isso, consideramos que a crítica de Nietzsche à modernidade passa necessariamente pela crítica à metafísica clássica. Em nossa pesquisa, destacamos algumas questões como: o que em nós aspira à verdade? Por que e para que a moral cristã? O que caracteriza a modernidade? Seria o apelo ao gosto democrático? É possível reinventar a modernidade? Em nosso trajeto, salientamos o vínculo que existe entre a noção de verdade, a democracia e os valores morais cristãos, mostrando que esses valores morais foram herdados da cultura socrática. Também pretendemos esclarecer a proposta nietzschiana de um novo modo de fazer filosofia, que seria capaz de ultrapassar a decadência que impera na moderna cultura europeia. Ou seja, o término desta pesquisa aponta para os “filósofos do futuro”, filósofos capazes, segundo Nietzsche, de afirmar a vida além das oposições metafísicas, além do bem e do mal.

     Emmanuel Kant, in his work Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, inquires about the nature of the supreme principle of morality, aiming at a formulation of the metaphysics of morals. This study tries to determine the supreme moral principle from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and to present the key concepts of the first section as the basis for a discussion on the groundwork of morals. Following that, we consider analyzing the remainder of the work from the standpoint of two critics to Kant by some of his interpreters, namely: i) Kant would have created many formulations of “supreme moral principle”, bringing forth a problem of compatibility of formulations; ii) Kant would be unclear and, therefore, would have failed in this task when trying to demonstrate the inference of the supreme principle in the third section. From that analysis, it is intended to verify, therefore, whether the critics to Kant are coherently supported by the Groundwork, as well as to clarify, from this opposition, Kant’s view of the supreme moral principle.

No início dos anos de 1870, o filósofo alemão Friedrich Nietzsche, professor de filologia em Basileia, inicia a sua produção filosófica, marcada pela publicação de O nascimento da tragédia, em 1872. Nietzsche se dedica com entusiasmo, neste período, a estudar e escrever sobre os gregos, entre eles, sobre os primeiros filósofos. Os textos póstumos de juventude Os filósofos pré-platônicos, também conhecido como as Lições, escritas para uso didático, e A filosofia na época trágica dos gregos são resultado de sua pesquisa profunda e apaixonada pelos mais antigos filósofos. Usando como fonte principal estes dois textos, esta dissertação tem como objetivo elucidar a interpretação desenvolvida por Nietzsche sobre o filósofo Heráclito. Para isso, passamos pelas considerações nietzschianas sobre Tales, Anaximandro (sobretudo) e Parmênides, investigamos os quatro conceitos destacados e analisados nas Lições – devir, justiça (Díke), combate (pólemos) e fogo – e, por fim, aprofundamos nossa análise sobre a metáfora do mundo, isto é, do devir, como um jogo de criança que constrói e destrói castelos de areia à beira mar. Veremos que, para Nietzsche, Heráclito teve uma visão estética do mundo, uma visão contemplativa e alegre do mundo, do devir, marcado pelo eterno construir e destruir. Este é o espetáculo que, segundo Nietzsche, teria sido descortinado primeiramente por Heráclito e que deve ser contemplado eternamente.

O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar a crítica de Hegel à forma de pensar do
Entendimento (Verstand) e a perspectiva de um novo conceito de Razão (Vernunft) ou
racionalidade que daí surge, e isto tendo como base os três momentos do processo
lógico (o momento do Entendimento, o Dialético e o Especulativo) apresentados por
Hegel na Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas. Mostrar-se-á que esta crítica se faz
imanente à própria filosofia de Hegel, pois o Entendimento é tanto o objeto da crítica,
como um dos momentos que constituem o próprio processo lógico-dialético (método
dialético) que define a racionalidade hegeliana. Assim, a partir dessa inserção do
Entendimento na própria Razão, ver-se-á que a crítica de Hegel não se dará apenas de
forma destrutiva, de modo tal que o Entendimento fosse totalmente negado, mas antes
elevará este mesmo Entendimento ao nível da Razão especulativa, tirando-lhe assim o
seu pretenso lugar de faculdade absoluta da verdade e apontando-lhe o seu verdadeiro
lugar.

A presente dissertação objetiva apresentar os fundamentos da ética kantiana no que concerne ao juízo moral acerca das práticas sexuais. Mostra que o ato sexual, para o filósofo, inevitavelmente degrada os indivíduos que nele tomam parte, dada a sua natureza objetificadora, manifesta no uso dos indivíduos como meros meios para a obtenção de prazer. Para solucionar tal aporia da natureza – posto que humanidade é um fim em si mesmo, em virtude de ser portadora de racionalidade, não podendo, por isso, ser tratada como mero meio – Kant afirma ser o matrimônio o lócus moral adequado para o exercício da sexualidade, dada a reciprocidade aí forjada, impedindo a degradação.  No casamento, o vínculo estabelecido entre o impulso da natureza para a conservação da espécie – concretizado por meio do intercurso sexual aberto à procriação – e o dever do homem para consigo mesmo enquanto ser animal – preservar a espécie sem degradar a pessoa – é cumprido de modo plenamente moral. Este texto clarifica que a justificativa para a assunção desta solução se fixa em dois desdobramentos do imperativo categórico: as fórmulas da humanidade e da lei da natureza. A despeito do fato da primeira trazer contribuições significativas para as relações humanas graças ao conceito de reciprocidade, a segunda estabelece um papel normativo para o argumento teleológico da sexualidade, tornando-se um entrave na filosofia prática kantiana. Para ultrapassar tal obstáculo, esboçamos uma crítica que recorre aos estudos de Michel Foucault acerca do sexo e das técnicas de poder a ele relacionadas, produtores de uma scientia sexualis no Ocidente, mostrando que a moral do filósofo de Königsberg também se inscreve, de alguma forma, neste projeto. Por fim, numa leitura foucaultiana da Aufklärung kantiana, reconhecemos que, para propor novas possibilidades éticas da vivência da sexualidade, urge pensar e criar novos espaços relacionais nos quais o sujeito assuma, autonomamente, o governo de si.

Ao construir o livro A Arte e o espaço - intitulado originalmente Die Kunst und der Raum (1969) - juntamente com Eduardo Chillida e dedicar o seu texto  ao escultor, Heidegger parece ver nas obras de Chillida alguns de seus temas fundamentais resgatados e reunidos. Essa mesma fusão de conteúdo e pensamento Heidegger pareceu encontrar em seu diálogo travado, em outro momento, com a poesia de Friedrich Hölderlin.O que se pretende com este trabalho de dissertação é apresentar alguns conceitos fundamentais em Heidegger, notadamente sobre espaço, lugar e arte, assim como o modo como estes dialogam com as obras e o pensamento do escultor Eduardo Chillida.Dentre os pontos principais dessa convergência de pensamento entre o filósofo e o escultor, encontramos: a definição de arte; a relação mundo e terra; o pensamento acerca do lugar da arte nos dias atuais; e os significados de espaçar, in-corporar e de positivar o espaço.

A formalizacao de sistemas de logica em deducao natural traz muitas vantagens meta-teoreticas, das quais e sempre destacada a prova de normalizacao. Os sistemas de logica modal ate bem recentemente nao eram costumeiramente tratados pelo vies da deducao natural, contudo algumas formulacoes, provas de normalizacao e tentativas de provas surgiram. Esse trabalho e uma apresentacao de alguns sistemas importantes de logica modal em deducao natural ja existentes, e de alguns procedimentos de normalizacao para eles, mas e tambem, e principalmente, a apresentacao de uma hierarquia de sistemas de logica modal em Deducao Natural do sistema K ao sistema S5 e um esquema da prova de normalizacao do sistema K, que e modelo para a normalizacao nos outros sistemas.

A dissertação introduz a relação entre Heidegger e os japoneses, da chamada Escola de Filosofia de Quioto, por meio da investigação do nexo entre Identidade e Diferença como problema central da comparação filosófica Ocidente/Oriente. O intuito é evidenciar como justamente essa questão desperta a chamada Comparative Edge, ou filosofia das fronteiras ou limites comparados, semeando no seio da filosofia contemporânea uma nova possibilidade de pensar os temas convenientes dos tempos hodiernos por meio da comparação entre fronteiras.

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Grande parte dos pensadores da ética ambiental credita a crise ecológica da atualidade ao fato de que tanto o pensamento quanto as ações dos seres humanos seriam antropocêntricos, ou seja, teriam como objetivo único a satisfação de necessidades e desejos dos próprios homens. No entanto, uma cuidadosa investigação sobre a relação que os humanos mantêm entre si poderia revelar que talvez não sejamos verdadeiramente nem sequer antropocêntricos. O objetivo deste trabalho é tentar trazer à luz mais conhecimentos sobre isto: se de fato pensamos e agimos de forma antropocêntrica, como é amplamente aceito. E parece que conseguimos nos aproximar de uma resposta satisfatória para a questão.

Este trabalho trata da questão da tecnologia no pensamento de Herbert Marcuse, explicitando
a fusão entre tecnologia e dominação que resulta num aparato tecnológico totalitário. Desse
modo, a civilização tecnológica é sustentada e justificada por uma racionalidade tecnológica
que serve como uma força de ajuste causando uma paralisia da crítica. Ao analisar o aparato
tecnológico na sociedade administrada percorremos não somente no pensamento filosófico de
Marcuse, mas de outros grandes pensadores, com Heidegger, Hegel, Marx, como também um
debate sobre a filosofia da ciência e da lógica lingüística. O autor aponta para a necessidade
de uma nova racionalidade tecnológica que aconteceria por meio de uma nova sensibilidade
onde a técnica possibilitaria uma nova relação do homem com a natureza. A partir daí,
emergiria a necessidade de um novo sujeito, esta transição seria possível por meio da
sensibilidade, onde arte se converteria em arte da vida. Com a vinculação entre arte e técnica
possibilitada pela nova sensibilidade, o autor deixa umas das suas principais contribuição, que
reside no ato de deixar em aberto a possibilidade de uma nova meta.

A presente dissertação tem por objetivo abordar o conceito de liberdade sob a ótica do filósofo francês Jean-Paul Sartre, tendo como pano de fundo principal a obra O Ser e o Nada (Ensaio de Ontologia Fenomenológica). Tentar-se-á aqui, após a apresentação do conceito sartreano de liberdade, mostrar que esse conceito traz a reboque a noção de responsabilidade, o que vem, em última análise, a nos levar a definir a filosofia sartreana como uma filosofia da ação. Embora esta pesquisa esteja balizada pelas densas linhas do ensaio aqui referido, serão abordadas também outras obras do pensador francês no sentido de se tentar atingir o objetivo da pesquisa.                                                          

Essa dissertação descreve um estudo realizado sobre o diálogo “Fedro” de Platão, com o

objetivo de apresentar uma interpretação do mesmo a partir da hipótese de que esse

diálogo pode ser lido como uma reflexão sobre a questão da paidéia. Encontramos

indícios para justificar essa leitura tanto no contexto cultural da época do diálogo como

na própria narrativa do texto. Em relação ao contexto cultural, observamos que a retórica

se tornara a principal disciplina na formação dos atenienses, em grande parte por causa

das instituições democráticas que favoreciam esse tipo de prática. Em relação à narrativa,

observamos que essa é, em larga medida, a história de como Sócrates guia a alma de

Fedro para a filosofia. Desse modo, consideramos que o objetivo central de Platão é

problematizar essa disciplina e apresentar a perspectiva filosófica sobre a possibilidade

de uma arte dos discursos. Para isso, Platão faz uma análise da retórica, uma apresentação

da dialética e discute a relação entre oralidade e escrita. Consideramos que todos esses

elementos ganham sentido na medida em que servem para pensar a formação cultural dos

atenienses.

Visando a elucidar a importante contribuição da ética do cuidado no aperfeiçoamento das relações humanas íntimas e sociais, este trabalho revela a fragilidade e insuficiência da ética atual para a formação de uma sociedade justa, igualitária, pacífica e cuidadosa. Para tanto é feito um estudo sobre o desenvolvimento moral de homens e mulheres, alertando para as naturais diferenças de comportamento e pensamento existente entre os sexos, as quais modificam para ambos a maneira de ver a vida e de vivê-la - o que não implica em inferioridade para algum dos gêneros. Partindo desse estudo, fica claro que o cuidado natural é inato ao humano, o que lhe propicia a tendência de agir em favor do bem de todas as formas de vida e da natureza como um todo. Mas evidencia-se aqui uma sensibilidade maior das mulheres a esse cuidado por elas possuírem percepção e emotividade mais aguçadas que os homens, o que as tornam mais participativas e envolvidas em relacionamentos. Essa maior abertura ao cuidado encontrada na mulher, deve-se em parte ao forte e duradouro relacionamento com suas mães. Assim, é revelado o poder que as mulheres têm em mudar positivamente a direção dos relacionamentos humanos, proporcionando com seu exemplo cuidadoso, protetor e solícito, o despertar de uma ampla e nova ética - com abertura para a verdade, para particularidades e principalmente para os afetos. Portanto, a ética do cuidado surge das experiências de vida das mulheres e almeja, por meio delas, juntar-se à moralidade masculina no intuito de trazer à tona a relevante realidade da interdependência entre os seres, da fragilidade humana e a necessidade das relações afetivas para a plenitude da vida.

Lamentavelmente, a política brasileira caracteriza-se pela falta de ética. Ressalvadas algumas

poucas exceções, nossos representantes costumam comportar-se no exercício do poder como

se ali estivessem para cuidar dos próprios interesses e não da coisa pública. A despeito da

insatisfação que a situação parece provocar junto à boa parte da sociedade, o eleitorado não

consegue transformar sua indignação em gesto efetivo no sentido de retirar da cena pública

pessoas que não sabem honrar o mandato recebido nas urnas. Pelo contrário, a reeleição de

maus políticos tornou-se fato corriqueiro. Neste estudo, propusemo-nos a discutir o assunto à

luz das teorias filosóficas tradicionais, selecionando expoentes do pensamento ético do

Período Antigo até o Moderno. Dedicamos especial ênfase, por conta do amoralismo presente

nas ideias do pensador florentino, à doutrina política de Maquiavel.

O presente trabalho pretende mostrar que o ceticismo é um dos principais desafios para a filosofia moderna desde a deflagração da Reforma Protestante e a redescoberta e tradução dos textos de Sexto Empírico. A recepção desse ceticismo é um dos principais fatores que determinou a nova fundamentação da filosofia moderna com base na subjetividade. É nesse pano de fundo de uma nova fundamentação da filosofia, sob o fundamento da subjetividade, que Hegel aborda o problema do ceticismo. O pensamento desenvolvido por Hegel no período de Jena (1801-1807), principalmente no escrito da Diferença entre as filosofias de Fichte e Schelling, e nos artigos do Jornal Crítico de Filosofia, Relação do ceticismo com a filosofia e Fé e Saber, parte do diálogo com a filosofia do idealismo alemão, que é o ápice do subjetivismo na filosofia desenvolvida a partir da retomada do ceticismo, Hegel tenta, por meio da interpretação e superação do ceticismo, estabelecer um novo fundamento para a filosofia. Portanto o ceticismo, nesse período da filosofia de Hegel, possui o papel de ser a negatividade inerente à autêntica filosofia que aniquila o ponto de vista das filosofias da subjetividade. Esse modo como Hegel incorpora o ceticismo a sua filosofia possui seu ponto alto na Fenomenologia do Espírito. A figura do ceticismo perfeito, apresentada na introdução da Fenomenologia do Espírito, possui o papel de fazer a passagem do ponto de vista das filosofias da subjetividade, para o ponto de vista especulativo da razão.