The Social Impact of Pecuniary Penalties: From Judicial Process to Real-World Outcomes
Public Governance. Pecuniary Penalties. National Council of Justice. Administrative Transparency. Institutional Innovation.
Abstract
This dissertation investigates the institutional governance of the allocation of pecuniary penalties within the Brazilian Judiciary, analyzing the regulatory role of the National Council of Justice (CNJ). The central problem lies in the structural gaps in governance, transparency, and accountability regarding the management of these resources (fines, pecuniary penalties, and non-prosecution agreements). The study mobilizes the theoretical framework of contemporary public governance, linking it to institutional innovation and administrative efficiency. The qualitative and documentary methodology is based on a national and international literature review and the analysis of the CNJ's regulatory framework, without primary data collection or quantitative analysis.
The results reveal that, despite the regulatory advances induced by the CNJ, the system still lacks a unified national model. Regulatory asymmetries persist among courts, alongside weaknesses in financial traceability, a lack of active transparency, and low social participation in resource allocation. As a technical contribution, the research proposes a conceptual governance model structured into four interdependent dimensions: transparency, institutional control, traceability, and social participation. It concludes that standardizing and modernizing the administration of pecuniary penalties is imperative to strengthen the legitimacy of the justice system and promote effective accountability to society.