The present study analyzes the effects of the predominance of the management role and the supervision of the Board of Directors (CA) on long-term corporate investment (ICLP) in a group of companies listed on B3 Brasil Bolsa Balcão SA, belonging to the basic segment, in the period from 2014 to 2018, measuring the impact both in terms of the level variation and by the improvement of investment efficiency. Thus, the work investigates which roles played by the Board of Directors affect the level and efficiency of corporate investment and which type of role is associated with higher levels of capital allocation and the hypothesis of investment inefficiency. That is, what role, when exercised predominantly by the Board, is related to behavior of underinvestment and overinvestment, as an additional analysis, it is verified if the managerial role, when predominant, is associated with a greater investment in associates / controlled companies and whether the presence of institutional investors is related to the role adopted by the Board. The supply of this research is due to its original character in investigating a theme, still little explored in national and international literature, adding knowledge to the emerging literature that deals with the relations between Governance of the Board of Directors and Efficiency of corporate investment. In order to classify the roles played by the Board of Directors, a content analysis was carried out in the Minutes of the Board of Directors, using the classification scheme proposed by Schwartz-Ziv; Weisbach (2013) who classifies the roles based on the approved decisions of the board members contained in the minutes, in turn, using the efficiency model of Biddle, Hilary and Verdi (2009) to group the firms in situations of underinvestment and overinvestment. Subsequently, to measure the effects on long-term corporate investment, perform regressions with panel data, due to the possibility of endogeneity problems, we opted to use the GMM-system method. The results contribute to the literature by identifying whether the CA impacts the investment level and its monitoring does in fact contribute to the absence of investment inefficiencies, in addition to relating how each role influences the level and efficiency of the allocated capital, also, demonstration if the presence of institutional investors is related to the predominance of some role.