Economic Regulation and the Efficiency of Brazilian Water Utilities: An Analysis Based on Revenue Collection Efficiency
economic regulation; water supply; sanitary sewage; efficiency; DEA; revenue collection.
This study analyzed the influence of economic regulation on the revenue collection efficiency of water utilities in Brazil. The research is characterized as descriptive, quantitative, and documentary, using operational, financial, and regulatory information from a sample of 45 sanitation service providers between 2020 and 2024. The study focuses specifically on revenue collection efficiency, seeking to understand how economic regulation influences the ability of utilities to convert billed revenues into revenues effectively collected, an aspect directly related to the sector’s financial sustainability. In the first stage, the Dynamic Slack-Based Measure Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA-DSBM) model, incorporating carry-over intertemporal variables, was applied to measure the revenue collection efficiency of the utilities. Additionally, the Malmquist Productivity Index was employed to evaluate productivity changes over the analyzed period. In the second stage, econometric models were estimated using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE), complemented by random-effects panel data analysis. The results indicated an overall average efficiency score of 76.19%. Regarding the effects of economic regulation, the number of regulatory agencies showed a positive and statistically significant influence on revenue collection efficiency, whereas the length of the regulatory period and the existence of a regulatory agency were not statistically significant in the main model. Indebtedness exhibited a negative relationship with efficiency, as did the North and South regions when compared with the reference category. In the productivity model (Malmquist), the existence of a regulatory agency showed a positive association, whereas the regulatory period and the number of regulatory agencies presented negative effects. It is concluded that economic regulation partially influences revenue collection efficiency, with the intensity of regulatory oversight being more relevant than its mere formal existence.