Banca de DEFESA: CECÍLIA MARIA MEDEIROS DANTAS DE MELO

Uma banca de DEFESA de MESTRADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
DISCENTE : CECÍLIA MARIA MEDEIROS DANTAS DE MELO
DATA : 10/03/2017
HORA: 14:30
LOCAL: SALA A1 - SETOR V/UFRN
TÍTULO:

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND PERSISTENCE OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: A STUDY IN THE BRAZILIAN MARKET SHARE

PALAVRAS-CHAVES:

Business Executives’ Compensation. Performance persistence. Stock control.

PÁGINAS: 67
GRANDE ÁREA: Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
ÁREA: Administração
SUBÁREA: Ciências Contábeis
RESUMO:

Studies on business executives’ compensation have been the focus of much discussion in academia and in the market. From the perspective of the Agency Theory, the theme constitutes one of the mechanisms of alignment of interests between principal and agent, capable of minimizing the existing conflicts between these two classes. To this end, it is associated with performance in order to alleviate agency costs and, consequently, avoid losses to shareholders. Thus, in this relationship, it is important to consider the persistence of the results, given that current performance is indicative of future performance. This research seeks to analyze whether executive compensation influences the performance persistence of the companies listed on BM&FBOVESPA. To achieve this objective, an econometric model was used with the variables - operating profit, fixed compensation, bonus, profit sharing, share-based payment, size, leverage and social responsibility level - for a sample of one hundred and four open companies, in the period from 2011 to 2015, whose information are available in the Bloomberg database. As a statistical tool, a dynamic panel approach was used by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to estimate the system Generalized Moments of Time (GMM-SYS) method. The results show that only the family control companies did not present persistent results. Regarding the compensation, it was observed that the fixed compensation contributes to performance persistence reduction on institutional controlled companies, whereas in the absence of control there is positive relation. In addition, it was found that the payment of bonuses makes the results more persistent in institutional and family controls. On the other hand, profit sharing had a negative outcome with operating profit in the previous year in family-owned companies. The stock-based payment influences the generation profit in a more persistent way only when the control is familiar or diffuse, differing from the findings of Baber, Kang and Kumar (1998) and Ashley and Yang (2004), in which there was no significant variable change. It was also observed that variables such as size and social responsibility contribute to increase the persistence of profits, while leverage contributes to their reduction.

MEMBROS DA BANCA:
Presidente - 1561014 - ADILSON DE LIMA TAVARES
Interno - 1543333 - ANDERSON LUIZ REZENDE MOL
Externo à Instituição - WENNER GLAUCIO LOPES LUCENA - UFPB