Banca de DEFESA: ANTONIO MARCIO DANTAS XAVIER
Uma banca de DEFESA de MESTRADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.STUDENT : ANTONIO MARCIO DANTAS XAVIER
DATE: 18/08/2026
TIME: 14:00
LOCAL: Remoto
TITLE:
Drafting of the Building Code for the Municipality of Currais Novos/RN
KEY WORDS:
Building code; licensing; clear language; urban planning; regulatory governance
PAGES: 142
BIG AREA: Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
AREA: Administração
SUBÁREA: Administração Pública
SPECIALTY: Política e Planejamento Governamentais
SUMMARY:
The oversight of outsourced service contracts with exclusive labor dedication is a strategicactivity for public governance, especially after Law No. 14.133/2021 and Normative InstructionSEGES/ME nº 05/2017, which expanded the duties of contract inspectors and managers. Evenso, little is understood about how these agents exercise discretion when implementing suchrules. This research aimed to understand how contract inspectors and managers at IFRNCampus Currais Novos exercise this discretion in the oversight of continuous services and tocollaboratively produce a casebook of cases and dilemmas to support critical reflection on thesepractices. It was grounded in the street-level bureaucracy perspective (Lipsky, 2010; Lotta,2010), which recognizes discretion as inherent to implementation work under scarce resourcesand ambiguous goals. A short-cycle collaborative action research was adopted, qualitative andapplied, through a single case study, with five participants (three inspectors and two managers)from a census universe of six designated agents. Data collection combined documentaryanalysis of six contracts, semi-structured interviews, and a feedback seminar, and the analysisarticulated content analysis, a gap analysis across the prescribed, instrumentalized, andpracticed planes, and collective communicative validation. The results revealed a robustnormative framework and disclosed three modes of oversight under the same rules: silence,contained competence, and rupture. The coexistence of these modes showed that the gapbetween the prescribed and the practiced stems not from noncompliance or the absence of rules,but from the conditions under which the instruments are used, notably the lack of training. Asa technical product, the Casebook of Cases and Dilemmas, collectively built and validated,translates the dispersed normative repertoire and opens to deliberation what the rules do notexhaust. It is concluded that improving oversight does not require multiplying rules, butrecognizing discretion as inherent and providing agents with the means to exercise it withgreater awareness, consistency, and security.
activity for public governance, especially after Law No. 14.133/2021 and Normative Instruction
SEGES/ME nº 05/2017, which expanded the duties of contract inspectors and managers. Even
so, little is understood about how these agents exercise discretion when implementing such
rules. This research aimed to understand how contract inspectors and managers at IFRN
Campus Currais Novos exercise this discretion in the oversight of continuous services and to
collaboratively produce a casebook of cases and dilemmas to support critical reflection on these
practices. It was grounded in the street-level bureaucracy perspective (Lipsky, 2010; Lotta,
2010), which recognizes discretion as inherent to implementation work under scarce resources
and ambiguous goals. A short-cycle collaborative action research was adopted, qualitative and
applied, through a single case study, with five participants (three inspectors and two managers)
from a census universe of six designated agents. Data collection combined documentary
analysis of six contracts, semi-structured interviews, and a feedback seminar, and the analysis
articulated content analysis, a gap analysis across the prescribed, instrumentalized, and
practiced planes, and collective communicative validation. The results revealed a robust
normative framework and disclosed three modes of oversight under the same rules: silence,
contained competence, and rupture. The coexistence of these modes showed that the gap
between the prescribed and the practiced stems not from noncompliance or the absence of rules,
but from the conditions under which the instruments are used, notably the lack of training. As
a technical product, the Casebook of Cases and Dilemmas, collectively built and validated,
translates the dispersed normative repertoire and opens to deliberation what the rules do not
exhaust. It is concluded that improving oversight does not require multiplying rules, but
recognizing discretion as inherent and providing agents with the means to exercise it with
greater awareness, consistency, and security.
COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Presidente - 1667439 - MABEL SIMONE DE ARAUJO BEZERRA GUARDIA
Externa à Instituição - MARIA DE LOURDES DE MELO SALMITO MENDES
Externa ao Programa - 1688259 - MARILENE BIZERRA DA COSTA - null