From the mystic to linguistic games: an analysis of religious language in Wittgenstein's philosophy and its import on the epistemology of religion
Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Religion, Mysticism
The present work aims to demonstrate the place of religious language within the framework of Wittgenstein's philosophy, as well as its effects on religious epistemology. We will start from Wittgenstein's first phase which is the phase of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, until its later phase post-Tractatus. We will dedicate a part to explaining how 'On Certainty' bequeaths us important principles for our understanding of the development of our beliefs, as well as our cosmovision. My thesis is that the great philosopher of the 20th century wants to protect religious language from the intrusions of science and metaphysics. He saw Christianity as the only way to happiness. In the first phase of his thought he affirmed that religious language occupied the mystical sphere of value, being, therefore, ineffable. Already in his later phase, he starts to see religious language as a form of life, thus abandoning the idea that religious propositions are ineffable, starting to make suggestions as to their grammar and the role of terms such as “God”, “Sin” and “Judgment
Final". Religious language, therefore, is one of the language games.