The main purpose of this research is to compare the epistemic credentials for belief in God in the religious epistemology of two of the most important thinkers in the contemporary analytic philosophy of religion: Alvin Plantinga (1932 - ) and Richard Swinburne (1934 - ). More specifically, the aim is to examine how belief in the existence of God can acquire a positive epistemological status, that is, how it can be intellectually justified or rationally or even warrant, on the basis of comparisons, contrasts, or additions that can be made between the proposals of the two philosophers. In this way, the aim is to evaluate how Plantinga and Swinburne deal with some of the fundamental issues in the analytic philosophy of religion that relate to nature and the relationship between faith and reason. To achieve this goal, three merits or epistemic credentials were selected: deontological justification, rationality, and warrant. In the first part of this thesis, the basic terms associated with the debate on the relation between faith and reason in contemporary analytic philosophy are clarified in order to elucidate the central problem of this thesis; moreover, what exactly it means for a belief to have the merit of justification, rationality, or warrant is clarified. In the second part, the two epistemological proposals that will be compared will be presented, namely, Alvin Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology and the probabilistic evidential balance proposed by Richard Swinburne's natural theology. Finally, the two proposals will be critically compared and the possibility of articulation between these two different approaches will be analyzed.