Is it fair to obey unfair laws? The civil disobedience and the exercise of democracy in John Rawls.
Justice as fairness; Constitutional democratic society; Justice; Legitimacy; Law; Rule of law; Civil disobedience; Public reason.
This paper aims to verify the compatibility between the practice of civil disobedience and the structure of a constitutional democratic society within the theory of the American philosopher John Rawls. To do so, basics that permeate Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness are analyzed - with particular emphasis on his idea of social contract and its arising principles of justice - its later configuration as a political conception of justice for a society as the main ideas and conceptions related to this concept are also explored. This paper also investigates the notions of justice and legitimacy of Law from a rawlsian perspective, as well as the analysis as considerations of the author on the rule of law. The fundamentals of obedience to the law are also approached from the perspective of justice theory as fairness, focusing on the applicable principles of justice to individual: the principle of fairness and the natural duties. It also promotes an analysis of the concept of civil disobedience, emphasizing its definition, justification and its role in democratic society, as well as distinguishing other forms of dissent from the law, such as militant resistance and conscientious objection. It still points out similarities and differences between Rawls's concept of civil disobedience and those from other authors such as Etiénne de La Boétie, Henry David Thoreau, Hugo Adam Bedau, and Martin Luther King. In the end, it is argued that civil disobedience has a stabilizing and therapeutic feature in democratic society and serves not only as a device for defending constitutional justice, but also as an appeal to maintain political order in the terms of public reason idea, although it is, in Rawls' theory, an excessively restrictive concept that does not reach the dimension of the conflict between democracy as a set of institutions and civil disobedience as an extra-institutional democratic manifestation that can assume insurrectional forms.