The problem of moral responsability in Arthur Schopenhauer's thought
Schopenhauer – Responsibility – Freedom – Necessity – Aseity.
In Schopenhauer’s philosophy, freedom lies in the Will only, actions are necessarily determined by causality. Thus, how would this simultaneous performance be compatible in man, the freedom of metaphysical will and the determinism of individual actions? Schopenhauer assures that every action is determined in the same proportion as a clock, but he also declares that man in his essence is will, which is free, almighty and enigmatic. This apparent contradiction can lead to the following question: how can man be determined, as in, not able to decide to be otherwise, but yet may be considered as his own work? This research follows analyzing the concepts involved in the problem brought up, looking for the answers that we can find in Schopenhauer’s thought. Once understanding that according to determinism actions are the result of motives known by the intellect in contact with the individual character, we will deal with the attributes of the character, taking into account that it is the will in itself as it comes objectified in a individual, as well as the secondary and accidental nature of the intellect, which despite being placed by tradition as the nucleus of man and the center of moral responsibility, we will see that it has an auxiliary role as a mere part of an organism. The will takes therefore precedence over the intellect as the essence and origin of man. For an understanding of its originary position we will analyze the meaning of the term aseity, considered by our author as indispensable for thinking about responsibility and imputability. We will also deal with the main objections and difficulties raised by scholars and commentators of Schopenhauer’s thought. The main question is to understand to what extent man can be held morally responsible for his actions, while it is his own work, in the sense of possessing aseity as an attribute, considering the freedom of the will and the determinism of the actions.