Logical Anti-exceptionalism Without Abduction
Epistemology of Logic, Logical anti-exceptionalism, Philosophy of Science.
A recent trend in the philosophy of logic, under the title of "anti-exceptionalism", proposes that the principles of logic are not to be justified by a priori intuitions, but rather as in the other sciences, by a posteriori or empirical evidence. How exactly the relation of logic and science is to be fleshed out by the anti-exceptionalist remains to be clarified. A favorite approach is to adopt "abductive argument" in justifying choice of logical theory. This thesis argues that abductivism in logic is committed to scientific realism, but that scientific realism cannot support logical abductivism. Given this impasse, scientific realism should be rejected by anti-exceptionalism. The present study goes on to survey different approaches to the justification of logical knowledge which align with different theories of science, concluding that the best option is to understand logic in terms of constructive empiricism. While this proposal rejects adopting abduction to justify logical theory choice, it is compatible with the anti-exceptionalist stance of treating logic as a science.