Gödel’s Slingshot Revisited: Does Russell’s Theory of Descriptions Really Evade The Slingshot?
Slingshot Arguments; Definite Descriptions; Plural Logic.
The family of arguments called “Slingshot Arguments” are a family of arguments underlying the fregean view that if sentences have reference at all, their references are their truth-values. Usually seen as a kind of collapsing argument, the slingshot consists in proving that, once you suppose that there are some items that are references of sentences (as facts or situations, for example), these items collapse into just two items: The True and The False. This is a dissertation about the slingshot which is dubbed Gödel’s slingshot. Gödel argued that there is a deep connection between these arguments and definite descriptions. More precisely, according to Gödel, if one adopts Russell’s interpretation of definite descriptions (which clashes with Frege’s view that definite descriptions are singular terms) it is possible to evade the slingshot. We challenge Gödel’s view in two manners, first by presenting a slingshot even with a russellian interpretation of definite descriptions and second by presenting a slingshot even when we change from singular terms to plural terms in the light of new developments of the so called Plural Logic. The text is divided in three chapters, in the first chapter we present the discussion between Russell and Frege regarding definite descriptions, in the second chapter we present Gödel’s position and reconstructions of Gödel’s argument and in the third chapter we prove our slingshot argument for Plural Logic. In light of this results we conclude that we can recovered slingshots even with a russellian interpretation of definite descriptions or in a context of Plural Logic.