Executive Compensation and Corporate Earnings Persistence: A Study in Brazilian Stock Market
Executive Compensation. Persistence. Earnings.
Studies about executive compensation have been the focus of much discussion in academy and in the market. From the perspective of the Agency Theory, the theme is one of the alignment mechanisms of interest between principal and agent, able to minimize the conflicts between these two classes. For this, it is associated with the corporate performance in order to mitigate agency costs and, consequently, avoid losses to shareholders. Thus, in the relationship between pay and performance, it is important to consider the earnings persistence. This research aims to analyze whether the executive compensation influences the earnings persistence of companies listed on the BM&F Bovespa, considering the period from 2013 to 2015. The sample to be used involves companies with shares traded on the BM&F Bovespa who published the financial statements, whose information is available on the Bloomberg database, and forms of reference for the reporting period. To achieve this purpose, it will be used regression with panel data estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for dynamic approaches.